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ENDING INDEFINITE DETENTION OF
NON-CITIZENS
“It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards
of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies
involving not very nice people.”1
–Justice Felix Frankfurter
INTRODUCTION
In 1988, Santos Hernandez–Carrera, a refugee from Cuba,2 was
convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to six years in prison.3 He
was released from prison in 1993, and, if he had been a United States
citizen, he might now be a free man. But because he is not a citizen,
he will remain detained indefinitely. He may be an unsympathetic and
unlikely person to use as the exemplar for an immigrants’ rights
argument, but the very fact that he has offended public sensibilities
encourages consideration of the foundation of constitutional
protections—whether that foundation is a shared humanity or a
particular legal status.
Hernandez–Carrera’s conviction required that he be deported once
he completed his prison term in 1993, but the United States and Cuba
did not have an agreement under which he could be “removed.” The
Immigration and Naturalization Service, (“legacy INS”)4 continued to
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Santos Hernandez–Carrera was one of over 125,000 Cubans allowed to enter the United
States as part of the Mariel Boatlift in 1980. Brief for Appellees at 2, Hernandez–Carrera v.
Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2008) (No. 08-3097). During a four month period in 1980, the
Cuban government opened its port in Mariel, Cuba to American citizens to pick up their family
members. David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The
Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 56 (2002).
3 Brief for Appellees, supra note 2, at 2.
4 The Immigration and Naturalization Service was absorbed into the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) on March 1, 2003. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107–296, § 471, 116 Stat. 2135, 2205 (2002). The DHS requested that “legacy INS” be used to
refer to the agency prior to March 1, 2003, and “DHS” afterwards. AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, AILA PUBLICATIONS MANUAL OF STYLE 20 (2010), available at
http://aila.org/Content/default.aspx?docid=22107.
1
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detain him and over 3,000 other “non-removable” aliens5 until 2001
when the landmark case, Zadvydas v. Davis,6 held that indefinite
detention of lawful permanent residents (“LPRs”)7 raised serious
constitutional questions.8 After this decision, legacy INS released
over one thousand LPRs.9 While Hernandez–Carrera is not an LPR,
the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) should have released
him four years later when Clark v. Martinez10 extended the protection
against indefinite detention to inadmissible aliens. Instead, the DHS
determined that Hernandez–Carrera was “especially dangerous” and
continued to hold him pursuant to a new regulation.11 That regulation,
8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f), is the subject of this Note.
When Zadvydas disallowed indefinite detention, legacy INS
quickly promulgated 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f)12 under which Hernandez–
Carrera is presently held. The regulation requires the indefinite
detention of any alien if: (1) the alien committed a violent crime,
(2) the alien suffers from mental illness, and (3) there is no condition
of the alien’s release that can guarantee public safety.13 The
regulation provides some procedural protections, but these protections
fall well short of those afforded citizens. A line of Supreme Court
decisions from 1972 to 1996 considered the substantive and
procedural due process problems inherent in the civil commitment of
5 “Alien” is the legal term used to refer to any non-citizen in the United States. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(3) (2006).
6 533 U.S. 678 (2001). At the time, if a non-citizen’s home country had no extradition
treaty with the United States, legacy INS could hold him indefinitely for an infraction as minor
as overstaying a tourist visa. Id. at 691. In 2001, Cuba, Laos, Cambodia, Guyana, and Vietnam
were among the nations to whom aliens could not be returned. Cindy Rodriguez, To Immigrant
‘Lifers,’ Prison Release is Overdue, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 5, 2001, at B1.
7 Immigrants who have not yet gained their citizenship can be classified in two groups:
lawful permanent residents and “inadmissible aliens.” See infra Part I.A. Santos HernandezCarrera was technically an “inadmissible alien” because by committing a crime, he violated a
condition of his parole. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2006) (providing that any alien who
commits a "crime involving moral turpitude" is inadmissible).
8 533 U.S. at 696.
9 See Robert Charles Hill & Donald Kerwin, Immigration and Nationality Law, 36 INT’L
LAW. 527, 534 n.68 (2002) (citing Caryl Clarke, Detainee Release Slowly Progresses, YORK
DAILY REC., Sept. 3, 2001, at 3A).
10 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
11 See Hernandez–Carrera v. Carlson, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1188 (D. Kan. 2008),
vacated, 547 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2008) (explaining that after Clark v. Martinez, the DHS
reviewed Hernandez-Carrera’s detention and determined that continued detention was warranted
under 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f)).
12 See Notice of Memorandum, 66 Fed. Reg. 38433 (July 24, 2001) (ordering the
development of new regulations “for aliens presenting special circumstances”); John S.
Richbourg, Liberty and Security: The Yin and Yang of Immigration Law, 33 U. MEM. L. REV.
475, 492–93 (2003).
13 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f)(1) (2010).
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mentally ill citizens.14 As a result, citizens convicted of even the most
atrocious crimes cannot be held beyond their prison terms without
considerable due process.15 If Hernandez–Carrera had been protected
by the procedures required for citizens, he would almost certainly be
free today.
Hernandez–Carrera was diagnosed with schizophrenia in 1993,16
and in the fifteen years since his DHS detention began, he received
five psychiatric evaluations, each confirming that he had some form
of mental illness. Only one found any predilection toward violence.
The other evaluators found that his “insight was good . . . , [he had]
adapted well to his incarceration,” and that “[t]here were no reports of
disciplinary incidents [in over five years], and no indication of
violence perpetrated against others while incarcerated.”17 The senior
psychiatrist at the University of Kansas Medical Center found that
Hernandez–Carrera’s mental health condition was unrelated to his
crime. In June 2006, the government’s own psychiatrist
recommended that he be released to a group home.18 Nevertheless, an
Immigration Judge found that Hernandez–Carrera met the
requirements of the DHS’s regulation, so the DHS could hold him
indefinitely.19 Hernandez–Carrera successfully challenged his
detention in federal district court,20 but the government won its appeal
14 See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731 (1972) (holding an Indiana statute which
allowed for indefinite detention for criminal defendants determined unfit to stand trail violated
due process); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432–33 (1979) (holding that in order to
commit a person to a mental institution in a civil commitment proceeding and still comport with
procedural due process , the State must prove by a preponderance the evidence that the person is
mentally ill); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77–78 (1992) (holding that a Louisiana statute
violated due process where it allowed for the indefinite commitment of a person acquitted on the
basis of insanity if that person exhibited anti-social behavior, regardless of whether that person
was still mentally ill); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997) (holding a Kansas statute
that allowed for the civil commitment of anyone who had conditions that fell within the statute’s
definition of “mental abnormality” satisfied due process); see also Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S.
407, 411–12 (2002) (holding that Hendricks does not require the State to prove complete lack of
control of his or her behavior, but it does require the State to prove some degree of lack of
control).
15 See, e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360 (holding that due process was met in the civil
commitment of a man convicted seven times for the sexual abuse of dozens of pre-pubescent
children).
16 Brief for Appellees, supra note 2, at 3. Schizophrenia is a condition that places him at
greater risk to be a victim of violence than to be a perpetrator of violence. Id. at 4.
17 Id. at 4.
18 Id. at 4–5.
19 Id. at 5 (“On February 10, 2006, an immigration judge issued a decision ordering
Carrera's continued detention under federal regulation 8 C.F.R. § 241.14.”).
20 See Hernandez–Carrera v. Carlson, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1191 (D. Kan. 2008)
(holding that Hernandez–Carrera was “entitled to release under appropriate conditions of
supervision”), vacated, 547 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2008).
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to the Tenth Circuit.21 In December 2009, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari.22 As a result, Hernandez–Carrera remains in prison.
Whether the DHS indefinite-detention regulation 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.14(f) can or should be overturned depends on the answers to
several difficult questions. First, may the Supreme Court assert its
authority and “say what the law is”23 with regard to the DHS
regulation? If it may, does the DHS regulation offend substantive or
procedural due process? If the DHS regulation satisfies due process,
does it nevertheless violate equal protection principles?
Constitutional questions that bear on the rights of immigrants are
particularly problematic. The doctrine of plenary power has
traditionally forestalled judicial review of the political branches’
immigration laws and regulations.24 When, as in Zadvydas, the
Supreme Court has hinted at the existence of immigrants’
constitutional rights,25 it has done so almost entirely through statutory
interpretation rather than a direct constitutional pronouncement.26 The
different categories of aliens create an added dimension of
uncertainty. The constitutionality of DHS’ indefinite-detention
regulation is a very close question.
This Note argues that though the Supreme Court is not compelled
by its precedents to strike down the indefinite-detention regulation, it
has ample latitude to, and should, do so. Absent Supreme Court
action, Congress should seize the earliest opportunity to indicate to
the DHS that the regulation is not authorized.
21 Hernandez–Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1257 (10th Cir. 2008) (vacating the
district court's prior decision ordering the release of Hernandez–Carrera).
22 Hernandez–Carrera v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (2009) (mem.), denying cert. to
547 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2008).
23 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
24 See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547 (1990) (“The
plenary power doctrine’s contours have changed over the years, but in general the doctrine
declares that Congress and the executive branch have broad and often exclusive authority over
immigration decisions. Accordingly, courts should only rarely, if ever, and in limited fashion,
entertain constitutional challenges to decisions about which aliens should be admitted or
expelled.”).
25 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001) (finding that “indefinite detention of
[lawful permanent residents] would raise serious constitutional concerns” and invoking the
canon of constitutional avoidance).
26 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 576–77 (2006) (avoiding Suspension
Clause question by denying that Congress intended its revocation of statutory habeas to be
retroactive); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (avoiding Suspension Clause question by
finding that statutory habeas right was not rescinded); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517
(2003) (finding that where a statute’s provision is purported to bar habeas review, Supreme
Court requires particularly clear statement that such is Congress’ intent); INS v. St. Cyr, 533
U.S. 289, 314 (2001) (finding that a statute did not rescind judicial review of matters of law
because to do so would pose constitutional questions).
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Part I of this Note reviews the tradition of plenary power and the
“entry fiction” doctrine by which earlier Courts upheld the denial of
immigrants’ constitutional rights. It discusses Zadvydas’s narrowing
of plenary power and the Supreme Court’s implicit recognition of
LPRs’ substantive right to be free from indefinite detention.27
Part II considers the parallel evolution of aliens’ rights to habeas
corpus review. Two recent lines of Supreme Court cases upheld
LPRs’ statutory right to judicial review in matters of law,28 and
recognized all aliens’ constitutional right to habeas corpus
protection.29 Equally importantly, these cases confirmed that plenary
power does not preclude the Supreme Court from overturning
unconstitutional immigration statutes.
Part III reviews the due process issues posed by civil detention of
persons considered dangerous to the community. Though the DHS
regulation does not violate the substantive component of Fifth
Amendment due process, its procedural protections fall well short of
those provided by state and federal civil commitment statutes. Part III
argues that Landon v. Plasencia30 exemplifies how the Supreme Court
should use Mathews v. Eldridge31 to evaluate the DHS regulation’s
procedural sufficiency. The Court may find the DHS regulation
unconstitutional, but because the Court stopped short of a definitive
ruling in Plasencia, such a finding is not compelled.
Part IV shows that equal protection arguments will not be
successful in challenging the DHS regulation, and Part V sets forth
two policy reasons for the Supreme Court to complete the work it
began in Plasencia and find the regulation unconstitutional or, in the

27 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of
Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 366 (2002) (reading Zadvydas as possibly a
radical shift in immigration law reasserting Supreme Court oversight of non-citizens’
constitutional protections).
28 See Demore, 538 U.S. at 517 (refusing to recognize congressional intent to deny
judicial review of questions of law and constitutionality); St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314 (declining to
recognize congressional intent to prohibit judicial review of important issues of law).
29 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008) (holding that the Suspension
Clause applies to enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay); Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 576–84
(holding that because Congress did not clearly intend law stripping federal courts of jurisdiction
to hear habeas petitions to be retroactive, two enemy combatants held at Guantanamo Bay could
file habeas petitions); Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485 (holding that federal courts had jurisdiction to hear
challenges to the indefinite detention of enemy combatants by the Executive branch).
30 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (considering what procedural protections are required when a lawful
permanent resident faces deportation after forfeiting her lawful status by helping smuggle aliens
into the country).
31 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (setting forth a balancing test to assess the sufficiency of
procedural protections when a private interest will be affected by government action).

1/11/2011 12:43:10 PM

6

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:3

alternative, for Congress to clarify that DHS is not authorized to
detain aliens indefinitely.
I. PLENARY POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A. Introduction
Before reviewing the Supreme Court’s evolving authority to
review the constitutionality of immigration statutes, it is necessary to
define several different categories of non-citizens. An “alien” is any
person in the country who is “not a citizen or national of the United
States.”32 Historically, the government has afforded different benefits
and levels of constitutional protection to different categories of
aliens.33 A discussion of plenary power and constitutional rights
therefore requires a clear description of these categories. Two
classifications are particularly important to the following discussion.34
The first distinction is between immigrants who intend to stay in the
country and create a life here, and nonimmigrants who do not intend
to abandon their residence in a foreign country.35 This Note deals
primarily with immigrants.
Among immigrants there are two major categories: (1) lawful
permanent residents (“LPR”)36 (immigrants who have been granted
permission to live and work in the United States), and
(2) inadmissible aliens (non-citizens who entered the country without
authorization or who are otherwise ineligible to enter the country or
remain).37 The government typically grants LPRs greater rights and
privileges.38
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006).
See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83 (1976) (finding that it is “unquestionably
reasonable” for Congress to differentiate between non-citizens based on their immigration status
and their duration in the country).
34 There are a wide variety of ways to categorize non-citizens. See id. at 79 n.13.
(describing the different classifications of aliens under American law).
35 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2006 & Supp. III 2010) (defining all non-immigrant
categories).
36 See id. § 1151 (describing the categories of non-citizens “who may . . . acquire the
status of an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence”).
37 See id. § 1182 (establishing health problems, criminal activity, national security and
foreign policy concerns, labor competition, and others as bases for an alien’s inadmissibility).
38 See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 389 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“[C]onstitutional questions raised by detaining inadmissible aliens are different from those
raised by detaining admitted aliens.” (emphasis omitted)); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763,
770 (1950) (“The alien, to whom the United States has been traditionally hospitable, has been
accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society.
Mere lawful presence in the country creates an implied assurance of safe conduct and gives him
certain rights.”).
32
33
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B. Plenary Power
Before the Supreme Court explicitly examines the constitutionality
of 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f), the indefinite-detention regulation, it must
decide if the doctrine of plenary power precludes such judicial
review. Though the Court is far from unanimous, its recent decisions
suggest that the plenary power doctrine does not bar constitutional
review of the regulation.
1. Roots of Plenary Power
In immigration law, plenary power is a separation-of-powers
doctrine under which courts have accorded to the political branches
almost absolute deference when the federal government legislates or
acts to deport or exclude an alien.39 The application of this doctrine to
immigration law has its roots in the anti-Chinese sentiments that
swept California in the 1880’s.40 After twelve years of lawful
residence in the San Francisco area, Chae Chan Ping obtained a
reentry permit and set off by steam ship to visit his family in China.41
During his absence, Congress reacted to the Chinese “menace to our
civilization” by passing a law that, among other provisions, denied
reentry to returning Chinese residents even if they had obtained
proper permits.42 After he was denied reentry in 1888, Chae Chan
Ping challenged the law, asserting vested rights, contractual rights,
and constitutional protections.43 The Supreme Court held that the
government had sovereign, constitutionally unrestrained plenary
power to exclude any non-citizen; therefore, Chae Chan had no such
rights or protections.44

39 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609–10 (1889) (holding that
Congress has plenary power, even in times of peace, to exclude aliens from or to prevent their
return to the United States for any reason).
40 Id. at 595.
41 Id. at 582.
42 Id. at 595.
43 DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 16
(2007).
44 See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606 (“The government, possessing the powers which
are to be exercised for protection and security, is clothed with authority to determine the
occasion on which the powers shall be called forth ; and its determination, so far as the subjects
affected are concerned, are necessarily conclusive upon all its departments and officers. . . . In
both [times of war and peace, the government’s determination of the necessity of exclusion] is
conclusive upon the judiciary.”); see also Daniel Kanstroom, Post-Deportation Human Rights
Law: Aspiration, Oxymoron, or Necessity? 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 195, 231 (2007). (“[T]he
Court rejected all of the doctrinal categories . . . including contractual rights, vested rights,
constitutional protections, and limited governmental powers.”).
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Shortly thereafter, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,45 a divided
Court held that Congress’ unrestrained immigration power included
the power to deport immigrants already living in the United States.
Cited by Supreme Court majorities more than seventy times,46 this
case became the foundation for immigration jurisprudence. Under
Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting, the doctrine of plenary power
asserted that the political branches should be unfettered by Supreme
Court review when they act to keep immigrants from entering the
country—called exclusion—and when they act to deport them—
called removal.
2. Early Limitations on Plenary Power
Early on, the Supreme Court recognized some limitations to the
government’s power regarding immigrants. In 1896, it acknowledged
aliens’ due process protections in federal criminal proceedings,47 and
in 1915, the Court held that Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
bars states from curtailing aliens’ economic opportunities.48 Initially,
these rights applied to the lives of immigrants in the United States,
but the rights did not limit government power over the processes of
immigration or deportation.
In Yamataya v. Fisher,49 however, the Court identified such a limit
to government power. Yamataya involved an inadmissible Japanese
woman who, within two weeks of arrival in Seattle, was the subject of
a warrant for “surreptitiously, clandestinely, unlawfully and without
any authority, com[ing] into the United States . . . .”50 The Court
insisted that it is a violation of due process to detain and deport
without a hearing even a non-citizen who was unlawfully and briefly
45 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (“The right of a nation to expel or deport [non-citizens] . . . is
as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country”).
Ironically, the author of the Chae Chan Ping opinion, Justice Field, penned the most passionate
dissent. Id. at 759 (Field, J., dissenting) (“As to its cruelty, nothing can exceed a forcible
deportation from a country of one's residence, and the breaking up of all the relations of
friendship, family and business there contracted.”).
46 Kanstroom, supra note 44, at 231.
47 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896) (holding that a federal statute
that punished non-citizens with hard-labor for up to one year without a judicial trial for the
crime of being in the country illegally was unconstitutional).
48 Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (finding an equal protection violation in an Arizona
law requiring establishments with five employees or more to have a staff consisting of at least
80% native born citizens); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (finding a Fourteenth
Amendment violation where a San Francisco ordinance requiring laundries in wooden buildings
to get a permit resulted in no Chinese persons being issued a permit while virtually every white
applicant was issued one).
49 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
50 Id. at 87.
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present in the United States.51 Though Yamataya is still cited today
for its limitation on congressional power in deportation proceedings,52
its scope was significantly curtailed with the advent of the “entry
fiction” doctrine.53
3. Entry Fiction—The Extreme of Plenary Power
Under the entry fiction doctrine, courts consider inadmissible
aliens to be “outside of the country for constitutional purposes.”54 In
Yamataya, the Court held that a woman “unlawfully” in the United
States was nevertheless entitled to due process protections. Yet, in the
early 1950s, two national security cases effectively ignored Yamataya
and introduced a new doctrine. In United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy,55 the government detained the wife of an honorably
discharged American soldier when she tried to enter the country.
After holding her for two months on Ellis Island, the Attorney
General denied her admission to the United States without any
process or explanation. When she challenged her exclusion in habeas
corpus proceedings, the federal courts denied her writ and the
Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that aliens had significantly restricted
due process rights.56 Though the Court devoted most of its brief
opinion to the political branches’ national security powers, the Knauff
opinion is most quoted for its broadly sweeping dicta that “[w]hatever
the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an

51 The Court found that the Secretary of the Treasury necessarily erred in interpreting the
congressional statute to allow deportation without giving the alien a chance to be heard. Id. at
101. “No such arbitrary power can exist where the principles involved in due process of law are
recognized. This is the reasonable construction of the acts of Congress here in question, and
they need not be otherwise interpreted.” Id.
52 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment entitles aliens
to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” (citing Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100–01)).
53 See Rosales–Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 391 n.2 (6th Cir. 2003) (“This paradox of
paroling aliens into the United States yet refusing to recognize their ‘entry’ into the United
States has been termed the ‘entry fiction’ by some courts.”).
54 Aaron Greene Leiderman, Agency Polymorphism, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 781, 783 n.3
(2009) (citing Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925)).
55 338 U.S. 537 (1950). On August 14, 1948, Knauff sought to enter the United States to
be naturalized but was detained at Ellis Island until October 6, 1948 at which time the Supreme
Court entered a final order of exclusion “without a hearing on the ground that her admission
would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States.” Id. at 539–40.
56 Id. at 543 (“Normally Congress supplies the conditions of the privilege of entry into the
United States. But because the power of exclusion of aliens is also inherent in the executive
department of the sovereign, Congress may in broad terms authorize the executive to exercise
the power, e.g., as was done here, for the best interests of the country during a time of national
emergency. Executive officers may be entrusted with the duty of specifying the procedures for
carrying out the congressional intent.”).
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alien denied entry is concerned.”57 The entry fiction doctrine was
significantly extended in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,58
when the Court denied both substantive and procedural due process to
a man facing indefinite detention.
Mezei was a lawful, gainfully employed resident of the United
States for over twenty years until 1948 when he left to visit his dying
mother in Romania. Romania denied him entry, and Hungary,
through which he was travelling, denied him an exit permit for
nineteen months. When he finally returned to the United States,
legacy INS detained him at Ellis Island. Legacy INS refused to
divulge the national security concerns upon which it based his
incarceration,59 and it continued to hold Mezei when it found that no
country was willing to take him. Over a “vigorous dissent”60 by
Justices Black, Jackson, Frankfurter, and Douglas, Justice Clark
wrote for the majority that because Mezei was not legally in the
United States, his indefinite detention violated no constitutional
right.61 Although Justice Clark’s opinion emphasized the importance
of the national security concerns, the denial of constitutional
protections to aliens requesting entry was soon expanded to
inadmissible aliens already present in the United States who posed no
national security risk.
In Leng May Ma v. Barber,62 a woman fleeing from persecution in
China arrived in the United States and claimed citizenship on the
ground that her father was a United States citizen. The government
detained her for fifteen months and then paroled her into the country
pending the review of her claim. Failing in her assertion of derived
citizenship, she sought protection from persecution back in China by
requesting asylum. At the time, asylum was available only to aliens
“within the United States,”63 and the Court determined that as a
parolee, she was not in the United States. “She was still in theory of
law at the boundary line and had gained no foothold in the United
States.”64 The advent of the entry fiction doctrine was thus the low
57 Id. at 544. Knauff denied the procedural due process required by Yamataya perhaps
because Knauff dealt with a woman who had never lived in the United States and who could be
returned to her home country. Knauff recognized Yamataya with no more than a “cf.” citation.
Id. at 543.
58 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
59 Id. at 209.
60 Motomura, supra note 24, at 558.
61 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 214–15 (“[T]he Attorney General may lawfully exclude respondent
without a hearing . . . . [H]e is treated as if stopped at the border.”).
62 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
63 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976).
64 Leng May Ma, 357 U.S. at 189 (quoting Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925)
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watermark for the Court’s recognition of aliens’ constitutional
rights.65 Apparently, aliens had none.
B. Narrowing Plenary Power
The entry fiction is still a living part of the “plenary power
edifice,”66 but the Supreme Court has narrowed its scope.67 In Landon
v. Plasencia,68 an LPR who had lived in the United States for five
years spent several days in Mexico. While returning, legacy INS
caught her helping several aliens make an unlawful entry into the
United States.69 Because of the nefarious purpose of her excursion
from the country, the Supreme Court held that she had relinquished
the statutory protections normally accorded to an LPR in a
deportation hearing. Nevertheless, the Court held that since she had
made a previous lawful entry as a permanent resident she was entitled
to due process before being excluded.70
This holding had two implications for plenary power. First, the
Court held that a lawful permanent resident did not necessarily lose
her due process protections upon reentry to the country after a brief
absence.71 Plasencia, therefore, arguably limited the entry fiction to

(Holmes, J.)). As in Mezei, Leng May Ma commanded only a five-justice majority. The four
dissenting justices objected particularly to the application of the entry fiction to deny protection
from persecution. Id. at 192 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“This alien is not in custody at our border.
She is here on parole. . . . How an alien can be paroled ‘into the United States' and yet not be
‘within the United States' remains a mystery.”).
65 Though one may speculate that the 5-4 Mezei decision may have turned on the national
security issue, by 2001 many courts generalized the holding. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 693 (2001); see also, Brian G. Slocum, The War on Terrorism and the Extraterritorial
Application of the Constitution in Immigration Law, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1025–26 (2007)
(interpreting the Mezei decision as “uncompromising” and clearly defining the scope of the
entry fiction).
66 Aleinikoff, supra note 27, at 374.
67 See Slocum, supra note 65, at 1025–26 (“[T]he [entry fiction] doctrine is not as
absolute as it might have once seemed. In Landon v. Plasencia, the Court indicated that a longterm resident alien had due process rights even though she had been stopped at the border after a
brief stay outside of the country.” (footnote omitted)); see also Richbourg, supra note 12, at 494
(complaining that Zadvydas rejected the government argument that since Zadvydas’ conviction
made him inadmissible, he was outside the border and without constitutional protections).
68 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
69 Id. at 23. As an LPR, Plasencia requested that her removal be litigated in deportation
proceedings where she would be afforded greater procedural protections. Id. at 26.
70 Id. at 35 (“[T]he courts must evaluate the particular circumstances and determine what
procedures would satisfy the minimum requirements of due process on the reentry of a
permanent resident alien.”).
71 Prior to the redefinition of “entry” and “admission” in 1996, whether a lawful
permanent resident retained her right to reenter the United States depended on whether her trip
was more than “an innocent, casual, and brief excursion.” Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449,
462 (1963). In 1996, Congress codified the Court’s holdings when it defined the new concept of
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immigrants who had not yet made a lawful entry.72 Second, and
equally important, Plasencia emphasized that its holding was
constitutional and not just statutory.73 This signaled the possibility
that the Supreme Court might be willing to limit plenary power
deference where sufficiently compelling constitutional rights were at
stake. It took almost twenty years, however, for it to do so.
C. Zadvydas v. Davis and Its Progeny
In 2001, Zadvydas v. Davis confirmed that Congress’ power to
regulate immigrants is constitutionally limited and that the Supreme
Court would assert its authority to enforce those limits.74 Kestutis
Zadvydas, a lawful permanent resident born to Lithuanian parents in a
German displaced persons camp, was ordered removed from the
United States due to his criminal activity.75 Neither Lithuania nor
Germany would accept him, and it became clear that his detention
would be indefinite.76 Legacy INS justified the detention as a

“admission.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (2006) (setting forth the statutory requirements for
lawful admission).
72 Aleinikoff, supra note 27, at 374 (“Mezei was read [by Plasencia] to apply only to
initial entrants . . . .”).
73 Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 329–30. To justify its recognition of due process rights in an
alien who had previously entered the country lawfully, Plasencia relied on Kwong Hai Chew v.
Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953), which had recognized such a right in a lawful permanent resident
who, prior to leaving for several months as a maritime sailor, had obtained immigration papers
to allow him to reenter. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 31 n.7. The Mezei majority cited but then ignored
Chew v. Colding’s holding when it concluded that “the legal incidents of an alien's entry remain
unaltered whether he has been here once before or not.” Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953). Plasencia effectively resuscitated Chew v. Colding by
affirming the constitutional foundations of its holding. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 33 (“Although the
[Chew v. Colding] holding was one of regulatory interpretation, the rationale was one of
constitutional law. Any doubts that Chew recognized constitutional rights in the resident alien
returning from a brief trip abroad were dispelled by Rosenberg v. Fleuti, where we described
Chew as holding ‘that the returning resident alien is entitled as a matter of due process to a
hearing on the charges underlying any attempt to exclude him.’” (quoting Rosenberg v. Fleuti,
374 U.S. 449, 460 (1963))).
74 See Ernesto Hernández-López, Sovereignty Migrates in U.S. And Mexican Law:
Transnational Influences in Plenary Power and Non-Intervention, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
1345, 1348 (2007) (“[I]n 2001, contrary to a century of precedent, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Zadvydas v. Davis explicitly stated that plenary power over immigration is ‘subject to important
constitutional limitations.’”); see also Aleinikoff, supra note 27, at 366 (by subjecting Congress’
immigration power “to important constitutional limitations” Zadvydas “may represent a radical
shift, a turning point for immigration law no less important than Miranda v. Arizona and Mapp
v. Ohio for criminal procedure, Baker v. Carr for equal protection, and Goldberg v. Kelly for
due process.” (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696)).
75 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 678.
76 The second case consolidated in the Zadvydas decision was that of a Cambodian, Kim
Ho Ma, who at the age of 17 was involved in a gang-related shooting, convicted of
manslaughter, and served two years of a 38-month sentence before being released into legacy
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permissible reading of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), which provided that an
“alien ordered removed who . . . has been determined by the Attorney
General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the
order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal period.”77 A 54 Court ruled that because Zadvydas was a lawful permanent resident,
legacy INS could not hold him indefinitely.78
The Court framed its decision as one of statutory interpretation,
relying on the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.79 The Court
explained that, “[b]ased on [its] conclusion that indefinite detention
. . . would raise serious constitutional concerns,” it was limiting postremoval-order detention to six months.80 Zadvydas included an
extensive analysis of its “serious constitutional concern,” citing
frequently the Court’s line of cases circumscribing the power of the
government to hold someone deemed dangerous to society in a noncriminal context.81 Dissenting, Justice Kennedy (joined by the Chief

INS custody. 533 U.S. at 685.
77 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2006) (emphasis added). The Section specifies four categories of
aliens to whom the extended removal period applies: (1) aliens who are inadmissible, and aliens
who are deportable because (2) they violated their immigration status, (3) they committed a
crime, or (4) they pose a national security threat. Id.
78 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 679 (holding that the detention statute implicitly limits an alien’s
detention “to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United
States”). The constitutionality of indefinite detention of post-removal-order aliens had been
questioned before. In 1952, the Senate Judiciary Committee rejected indefinite detention
proposed in the House version of the Immigration and Nationality Act because it “present[ed] a
constitutional question.” Martin, supra note 2, at 59 (quoting S. Rep. No. 2239 (1950)).
Congress ultimately authorized legacy INS to hold aliens for six months while arrangements
were made for removal. Thereafter, the bill provided for supervised release. Id.
79 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 679 (adhering to the general rule that if there are two equally
plausible interpretations of an ambiguous statute and one of the two poses constitutional
questions, then the doctrine of constitutional avoidance requires that the court assume that
Congress intended the other one); id. at 707 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that where a
court finds “two interpretations of equal plausibility, it should choose the construction that
avoids confronting a constitutional question.”).
80 Id. at 682. The Court limited to six months the presumptively reasonable time period
during which an alien can be held following the alien’s final removal order. Id. at 701.
81 Id. at 690–702. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738–39 (1972) (holding that,
prior to indefinite civil detention, full due process rights were due to a criminal defendant
unable to stand trial due to incompetence); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987)
(upholding pre-trial detention only for “the most serious of crimes” and only with “stringent
time limitations” and other judicial safeguards); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)
(holding that since “[f]reedom from physical restraint has always been at the core of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause,” the state may confine someone only if it shows by clear
and convincing evidence that he is both mentally ill and dangerous); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521
U.S. 346, 371 (1997) (finding no due process or double jeopardy violation where a sexual
predator had access to court-appointed counsel, the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and
other protections prior to post-sentence civil commitment, which included rehabilitation
services). The DHS focused particularly on the Hendricks dicta, which allowed that a “finding
of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify
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Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas) opined that an alien had no
substantive rights and was due no procedural protections, so there
were no constitutional questions to avoid.82 Nevertheless, the majority
recognized both substantive and procedural rights. As summarized by
Justice Souter, “The Zadvydas opinion opened by noting the clear
applicability of general due process standards: physical detention
requires both a ‘special justification’ that ‘outweighs the individual's
constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint’ and
‘adequate procedural protections.’”83
While framing a decision as statutory interpretation rather than a
constitutional pronouncement shows judicial deference to
congressional authority, Zadvydas was noteworthy for its limitation
on Congress’s plenary power.84 Justice Breyer explicitly emphasized
that plenary power “is subject to important constitutional
limitations. . . . Congress must choose ‘a constitutionally permissible
means of implementing’ that power . . . .”85 The Supreme Court
showed that it was prepared to go beyond merely reminding Congress
of its duty to respect Constitutional boundaries.86 Both in Zadvydas
and Plasencia, the Court’s rulings indicated that judicial restraint in
immigration was not absolute, and that it would step in and enforce
constitutional boundaries if Congress overstepped them. In Plasencia,
the Court insisted on procedural due process for an LPR being denied
reentry to the United States, and in Zadvydas, the Court disallowed
indefinite detention of LPRs.
While Zadvydas limited plenary power and recognized the rights
of LPRs, it left open three important questions. First, did the
prohibition of indefinite detention extend beyond LPRs to

indefinite involuntary commitment. We have sustained civil commitment statutes when they
have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as a ‘mental
illness’ or ‘mental abnormality.’” Id. at 358.
82 Zadvydas, 533 U.S at 721 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Whether a due process right is
denied when removable aliens who are flight risks or dangers to the community are detained
turns, then, not on the substantive right to be free, but on whether there are adequate procedures
to review their cases . . . .”).
83 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 553 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 690).
84 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 705 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Any supposed respect the
Court seeks in not reaching the constitutional question is outweighed by the intrusive and
erroneous exercise of its own powers. In the guise of judicial restraint the Court ought not to
intrude upon the other branches.”).
85 Id. at 695 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941 (1983)).
86 See Martin, supra note 2, at 71 n.64 (“For the critics the crucial issue is not whether the
Constitution controls, but whether the courts would play any role in holding the executive and
Congress to such limitations.”).
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inadmissible aliens as well? In Zadvydas, the government argued that
indefinite detention of all aliens was permissible under Mezei.87 The
Court could have ruled that Mezei was not controlling because
national security was a dominant concern in that case and not in
Zadvydas. The Supreme Court instead distinguished between
Zadvyas’ LPR status and Mezei’s inadmissible status.88 This
distinction suggested that indefinite detention might still be possible
for inadmissible immigrants like Mezei.89 Second, would the Court
explicitly recognize due process rights, either substantive or
procedural, in cases where aliens were detained temporarily?
Especially if indefinite detention is impermissible, there may be a
term of detention that is per se too long or that requires a minimum of
procedural protections. Third, could legacy INS continue to
indefinitely detain non-removable LPRs whom the agency deemed
dangerous to society? After Zadvydas, federal appellate courts
reached opposite conclusions as to whether an alien posing a danger
to society may be indefinitely detained, regardless of the required
procedural protections.
1. Indefinite Detention for Inadmissible Aliens
After Zadvydas, the circuits split as to whether Zadvydas sixmonth, post-removal limit on detention also applied to inadmissible
aliens. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits held that it did,90 while the
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits upheld legacy INS’s authority to hold
such aliens indefinitely.91 Significantly, the Sixth Circuit’s en banc
decision in Rosales–Garcia v. Holland explicitly repudiated the entry
fiction doctrine and rejected Mezei as controlling precedent.92 The
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 692.
Id. at 693 (“The distinction between an alien who has effected an entry into the United
States and one who has never entered runs throughout immigration law.”).
89 The language that caused the most difficulty was Justice Breyer’s comment: “We deal
here with aliens who were admitted to the United States but subsequently ordered removed.
Aliens who have not yet gained initial admission to this country would present a very different
question.” Id. at 682.
90 See Rosales–Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that
alien detention statute implicitly carries a reasonable time limitation); Xi v. INS, 298 F.3d 832
(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that, due to the Zadvydas decision, legacy INS must limit an alien’s
detention period to a reasonable time).
91 See Borrero v. Aljets, 325 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that the Zadvydas
decision did not apply where the alien was not admitted to the United States); Benitez v. Wallis,
337 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that detention of an inadmissible alien did not violate
due process), rev’d sub nom. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
92 Rosales–Garcia, 322 F.3d at 413–14 (reasoning that the Mezei decision was “explicitly
grounded . . . in the special circumstances of a national emergency” and the Attorney General’s
conclusion that Mezei was “a threat to national security”).
87
88
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Sixth Circuit concluded that an inadmissible alien must have
constitutional protections:
If [inadmissible] aliens were not protected by even the
substantive component of constitutional due process . . . we
do not see why the United States government could not
torture or summarily execute them. Because we do not
believe that our Constitution could permit persons living in
the United States . . . to be subjected to any government
action without limit, we conclude that government treatment
of [inadmissible] aliens must implicate the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.93
The Rosales–Garcia court also considered the statutory question
of whether Congress could have intended a different meaning for
inadmissible aliens than it did for lawful permanent residents. In
section 1231(a)(6), the text drew no distinction between LPRs and
inadmissible aliens in the subject of the sentence. “An alien ordered
removed who is inadmissible under section 1182 [or] removable
under section 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) [referring to
LPRs] . . . may be detained beyond the removal period . . . .”94 The
Rosales–Garcia court joined the Ninth Circuit in concluding that it
was implausible that Congress could have intended that legacy INS
could hold one group indefinitely but not the other.95
Because the Supreme Court agreed with this latter argument, it did
not reach the constitutional question.96 Writing for a 7-2 majority in
Clark v. Martinez, Justice Scalia sidestepped any constitutional
consideration and simply explained that the language of the statute at
the center of attention in Zadvydas allowed for no distinction between
lawful permanent residents and inadmissible aliens.97 By restricting

Id. at 410.
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2006) (emphasis added).
95 Rosales–Garcia, 322 F.3d at 408 (“[W]e can find no sound reason to interpret and
apply the statute one way for one category of aliens, but a different way for others.” (quoting
Borrero v. Aljets, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1042 (D. Minn. 2001))). Justice Scalia suggested the
same argument in his Zadvydas dissent. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 704–05 (2001)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Leiderman, supra note 54, at 784–85 (comparing this “lowest
common denominator” approach or “unitarianism” with agency “polymorphism” under which
an agency may interpret a statute differently in different situations).
96 The Supreme Court faced a split among the circuits and the real possibility that the
DHS would transfer detainees out of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits to hold them indefinitely.
Rosales–Garcia, 322 F.3d at 418 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
97 543 U.S. 371, 378 (“To give these same words a different meaning for each category
would be to invent a statute rather than interpret one.”).
93
94
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his opinion to statutory interpretation, Justice Scalia avoided
suggesting that inadmissible aliens had constitutional protections.
2. Temporary Detention of Aliens
Though Zadvydas arguably recognized a substantive due process
right for LPRs to be free from indefinite detention, it gave no
indication whether temporary pre-removal-order detention might also
pose constitutional problems.98 In Demore v. Kim, the Court
addressed this issue and considered whether the Fifth Amendment
was offended when an LPR, who had completed his criminal sentence
six months earlier, was still being held pending his removal hearing.99
Though the DHS held him without bail or a process to determine if he
was a danger to society or a flight risk,100 the Court found no due
process violation.101 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court,
distinguished Zadvydas in two ways. First, in Zadvydas the detention
was “‘indefinite’ and ‘potentially permanent,’” whereas Kim’s prehearing detention was “of a much shorter duration.”102 Second, the
detention in Zadvydas was outside the scope of plenary power
because removal was no longer possible, whereas the pre-hearing
detention in Demore v. Kim was part of the removal process.103 This
distinction suggested that plenary power may continue to have force
when the government acts within the narrow confines of exclusion
and removal.104
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, however, implied that even within
those narrow confines, an LPR’s right to liberty might trump the
government’s need for expediency when detention becomes
prolonged. “[S]ince the Due Process Clause prohibits arbitrary
deprivations of liberty, a lawful permanent resident alien such as
respondent could be entitled to an individualized determination as to
his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became
98 After an alien convicted of a crime has completed a prison term, he is turned over to the
DHS. He is held in detention waiting for a hearing to determine if he is removable. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c) (2006) (defining the Attorney General’s detention and release authority).
99 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). Kim had been convicted of burglary and petty
theft. Id. at 513.
100 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (“The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien
who . . . is deportable by reason of having committed [a specified criminal offense].”).
101Demore, 538 U.S. at 531 (“Detention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally
permissible part of that process.”).
102 Id. at 528 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S., at 690–91).
103 Demore, 538 U.S. at 527–28 (discussing how the pre-removal detention serves the
purpose of assuring that deportable aliens will be available for hearing and thus actually
removed if determined removable.).
104 See supra Part I.B.1.
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unreasonable or unjustified.”105 Though Justice Kennedy gave no
indication when detention would become “unreasonable or
unjustified,” he left the door open for a future Court to consider when
extended detention might become unconstitutional. As in Zadvydas,
he denied that aliens have substantive due process rights, but he
reminded his fellow justices that aliens may still be entitled to
procedural protections, even for detention that was not open-ended.106
When the Supreme Court found itself divided over the rights of
Guantanamo detainees three times in the next five years, Kennedy’s
viewpoint would determine the Court’s ruling: aliens have a right to
procedural due process when detention becomes prolonged.107
3. Indefinite Detention of Aliens Under “Special Circumstances”
The Zadvydas majority recognized an LPR’s substantive liberty
interest to be free from “an indefinite term of imprisonment,”108 but it
acknowledged that special arguments might be made for “terrorism or
other special circumstances.”109 When crafting its indefinitedetention regulation, legacy INS seized upon this language to limit
the reach of Zadvydas. The agency grafted the reference to “special
circumstances” to the majority opinion’s entirely unrelated reference
to civil detention cases.110 The result was a regime of continued
detention for any alien determined to be “specially dangerous.”111
This designation would attach to any alien who satisfied three criteria:
(1) he committed a violent crime; (2) he was likely to engage in future
acts of violence due to a mental condition; and (3) for him there was
105 Denmore,

538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
a due process right is denied when removable aliens who are flight risks or
dangers to the community are detained turns, then, not on the substantive right to be free, but on
whether there are adequate procedures to review their cases . . . .” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 721
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
107 See infra Part II.C.
108 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695.
109 Id. at 696.
110 Zadvydas cited the Hendricks line of cases to support its conclusion that indefinite
detention poses serious constitutional questions. Id. at 690. Later in the decision, the Court
explained that its prohibition of indefinite detention did not extend to “terrorism or other special
circumstances where special arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention and for
heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of
national security.” Id. at 696 (emphasis added). That the Court used the phrase “special
circumstances” in both sections of its opinion apparently provided legacy INS a plausible,
though disingenuous, connection.
111 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f) (2010). Section 241.14 also permits indefinite detention of an alien
“with a highly contagious disease that is a threat to public safety,” aliens “detained on account
of serious adverse foreign policy consequences of release,” and aliens “detained on account of
security or terrorism concerns.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.14(b)–(d).
106 “Whether
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no condition of release that could reasonably ensure public safety.112
Legacy INS included some procedural protections in the regulation,113
but these protections were significantly inferior to those required for
citizens facing long-term civil commitment.114 The circuit courts
ultimately split on whether the DHS’s indefinite-detention regulation
was authorized after Zadvydas limited detention to a maximum time
period of six months.
In 2004, in Tuan Thai v. Ashcroft,115 the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the Supreme Court had not authorized indefinite detention except
for reasons of national security. The court ruled that even “[a]n
alien’s ill mental health coupled with dangerousness cannot justify
indefinite detention under Zadvydas.”116 The Fifth Circuit reached the
same conclusion in Tran v. Mukasey.117 Tran found that the
government’s justification for detention was based upon the faulty
premise that Zadvydas allowed an exception to its general prohibition
from indefinite detention for aliens with “harm-threatening mental
illness.”118 The Tran court read Clark v. Martinez as explicitly
rejecting a different reading of section 1231(a)(6) for any subcategory
of aliens.119
The Tenth Circuit disagreed. In Hernandez–Carrera v. Carlson,120
the Tenth Circuit held that the DHS has the authority to detain an
alien indefinitely if the agency determines that the alien “poses a
special danger.”121 It argued that under National Cable &
112 8

C.F.R. § 241.14(f)(1)(i)–(iii).
new regulation required an administrative hearing at which the detainee, with the
help of a court-provided interpreter, would have a chance to examine evidence against him, to
cross-examine the government’s expert witness, and to bring a witness of his own. 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.14(g)(3). However, he would have no right to an attorney, no right to an expert witness of
his own, and no right to an interpreter to help review evidence and prepare a defense in advance
of the hearing. Id.
114 See infra Part III.B.2.
115 366 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2004).
116 Id. at 798. The court found that in drafting 8 C.F.R. § 241.14, the Attorney General took
the following Zadvydas dicta out of context: “certain special and narrow nonpunitive
circumstances” such as a harm-threatening mental illness, may outweigh “the alien's
constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.” Id. at 794. The Zadvydas
majority language taken in context “was intended to illustrate what the Government is generally
prohibited from doing . . . .” Id. at 795 (“[D]espite the Government's contentions to the contrary,
the reference in Zadvydas to special justifications and harm-threatening mental illnesses was not
a statement of what § 1231(a)(6) authorizes. It was instead, an explanation of why the Court felt
it was necessary to construe the statute narrowly.”).
117 515 F.3d 478 (5th Cir. 2008).
118 Id. at 483.
119 Id. at 482 (requiring the uniform application of § 1231(a)(6) to all aliens covered by the
statute).
120 547 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2008).
121 Id. at 1253.
113 The
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Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,122 Zadvydas
was not dispositive as to the DHS’s post-Zadvydas interpretation of
the detention statute. Brand X held that a “prior judicial construction
of a statute trumps [a subsequent] agency construction . . . only if the
prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the
unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency
discretion.”123 Since Zadvydas and Martinez “explicitly found the
statute to be ambiguous as to whether and under what circumstances
Congress authorized the Attorney General to detain aliens
indefinitely,”124 the Tenth Circuit concluded that the court should
defer to the DHS both as to the length of time an alien may be
detained and as to the possibility of indefinite detention.125
The DHS is within its authority to hold an alien indefinitely, so
long as the regulation satisfies procedural due process and contains
sufficient substantive limitations to indefinite detention.126 The court
found that both conditions were satisfied. Unlike the original DHS
regulation struck down by Zadvydas, the new DHS regulation was
limited to “a small segment of particularly dangerous individuals.”127
Moreover, the evidentiary burden required by the new regulations for
a finding of “particularly dangerous” provided sufficient procedural
protections.128 In December 2009, the Supreme Court denied
Hernandez–Carrera’s petition for certiorari,129 and the circuit split
remains.
D. Current Status of Plenary Power and Substantive Alien Rights
When Zadvydas explicitly limited the political branches’ action in
immigration, there was some speculation that it signaled an end to
plenary power—that the Supreme Court would no longer defer to the
political branches in their regulation of immigrants.130 Demore v. Kim
122 545 U.S. 967 (2005). Prior to Brand X, it had been well-established under Chevron that
when a statute administered by an agency “is silent or ambiguous” on an issue, courts owe that
agency deference if the agency’s reading is a “permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). Brand X clarified that
even when a federal court construed the statute before the agency did, the courts still owed
deference to the agency if the agency’s construction was permissible. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982.
123 Hernandez–Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1244 (alteration in original) (quoting Brand X, 545
U.S. at 982).
124 Id. at 1245.
125 Id. at 1256 (deferring to the Attorney General’s interpretation of § 1236(a)(6)).
126 Id. at 1251.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 1252.
129 Hernandez–Carrera v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1011, 1011–12 (2009) (mem.).
130 See Aleinikoff, supra note 27, at 366 (conjecturing that Zadvydas might represent a
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reaffirmed that the Court would exercise discretion in reviewing
immigration law, especially where the political branches acted within
the narrow scope of exclusion and deportation. Justice Kennedy’s
fifth-vote concurrence suggested, however, that deference to the
political branches might not be absolute even within that narrow
scope if constitutional boundaries were overstepped.
The location of those constitutional boundaries is still unclear.
Zadvydas identified a substantive liberty right of LPRs to be free from
indefinite detention. With Justice O’Connor, the fifth-vote in
Zadvydas, having retired, Justice Kennedy’s opinion takes on added
meaning. He made clear both in Zadvydas and Demore that while he
recognized no alien’s substantive right to liberty, he did recognize
procedural guarantees even for inadmissible aliens.
The Supreme Court’s decision to deny a writ of certiorari to
Hernandez–Carrera could indicate that the Court agrees with the
Tenth Circuit and will not expand Zadvydas, or it could simply mean
that the facts of the case did not provide a suitable opportunity to
invalidate the DHS’s indefinite-detention statute.131 The Supreme
Court’s recent line of alien habeas corpus cases demonstrate that the
plenary power doctrine no longer prevents the Court from directly
challenging the political branches when they withhold aliens’
constitutional protections.
II.

HABEAS RIGHTS—THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE132
APPLIES TO ALIENS

From 2001 through 2008, while Zadvydas and its progeny were
narrowing the plenary power doctrine and suggesting the existence of
aliens’ substantive liberty interests, the Court wrestled with the
question of whether aliens had a constitutional right to habeas
corpus.133 During the same term as Zadvydas, the Supreme Court used
“radical shift” in immigration law).
131 See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 907 n.5 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(“Denials of certiorari never have precedential value . . . .”). However, in Hernandez–Carrera,
the Tenth Circuit hinted that lawful permanent residents might be entitled to greater procedural
due process than inadmissible aliens, and it noted that Hernandez-Carrera had access to pro
bono counsel and his own expert testimony. 547 F.3d at 1255–56. Implicitly, a pro se LPR
would have a much stronger constitutional claim.
132 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).
133 A writ of habeas corpus is the order under which a person may challenge the legal
authority under which the person is being detained. B LACK ’ S LAW D ICTIONARY 778 (9th ed.
2009). The authority of federal courts to consider such a challenge is codified by federal statute.
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006). Since on its face the Suspension Clause prohibits Congress from
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the constitutional avoidance doctrine to tentatively assert LPRs’ right
to judicial review of matters of law.134 It used constitutional
avoidance twice more to protect the habeas rights of “enemy
combatants” imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay. When no longer able to
avoid confronting the question directly, the Supreme Court ruled that
the Suspension Clause applies to such aliens.135 Enemy combatants
are a class of “inadmissible aliens,”136 and the Court’s rationale for
granting them this constitutional right may apply to inadmissible
aliens as a whole.
A. Lawful Residents’ Right to Judicial Review
of Questions of Law
With the 1996 enactments of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) and Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRAIRA”), Congress tried to
eliminate judicial review under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the general habeas
corpus statute.137 The Supreme Court, however, held in Immigration
and Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr that the federal courts’ power to
review pure questions of law was undisturbed by either the AEDPA
or the IIRAIRA.138 In St. Cyr, legacy INS challenged an LPR’s right
to judicial review of his deportation proceeding following a
controlled-substance conviction.139 Though four dissenting justices
found no ambiguity in Congress’ intent to eliminate statutory habeas

suspending such a right, when Congress unambiguously amended the habeas statute to limit
judicial authority to review aliens’ detention, the Supreme Court was forced to consider whether
the Suspension Clause gave aliens a constitutional right to a writ of habeas corpus. See
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2243–44 (2008).
134 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 311–14 (2001) (holding that LPRs were not deprived
of their right to judicial review of questions of law).
135 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2247 (“The Clause protects the rights of the detained by a
means consistent with the essential design of the Constitution. It ensures that, except during
periods of formal suspension, the Judiciary will have a time-tested device, the writ, to maintain
the delicate balance of governance that is itself the surest safeguard of liberty.”) (internal
quotation omitted); see also infra Part II.C.
136 Since members of organizations which the United States government has designated as
“terrorist” and other persons who threaten national security are considered inadmissible aliens
under the immigration statute, Guantanamo detainees are “inadmissible aliens.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i) (2006) (2006) (“Any alien who . . . is a member of a terrorist organization . . .
is inadmissible.”).
137 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006). “[P]rotecting the Executive's discretion from the courts
. . . can fairly be said to be the theme of the legislation.” Reno v. American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 486 (1999).
138 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
139 Id. at 289.
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corpus and insisted that this intent be respected,140 the majority held
that to “preclude review of a pure question of law by any court would
give rise to substantial constitutional questions.”141 Since the LPR
framed his question as one of law, he was entitled to judicial review.
Two years later, in Demore v. Kim,142 six justices confirmed that
detained LPRs have a right to judicial review of matters of law.
Legacy INS interpreted section 1226(e) as revoking judicial review of
its bond and parole decisions. The statute stated:
The Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the
application of this [pre-hearing detention] section shall not be
subject to review. No court may set aside any action or
decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding
the detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation,
or denial of bond or parole.143
Chief Justice Rehnquist recited for the majority the doctrine that the
intent to revoke judicial review must be clear.144 He asserted that the
statute “contains no explicit provision barring habeas review” of nondiscretionary decisions.145 Since the detained LPR challenged the
statute’s constitutionality, the Supreme Court retained jurisdiction.
Justice O’Connor disagreed. She read the statute as unambiguously
rescinding judicial review of all legacy INS decisions.146 Based on her
own exhaustive historical analysis, she concluded that the writ of
habeas corpus would not have been available to aliens under common
law at the time of ratification in 1789, and so the Suspension Clause
140 Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O’Connor and Thomas joined. Id. at 327 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In categorical terms that admit
of no exception, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRAIRA), unambiguously repeals the application of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the general habeas
corpus provision), and of all other provisions for judicial review, to deportation challenges
brought by certain kinds of criminal aliens.” (internal citation omitted)).
141 Id. at 300.
142 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
143 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2006). If the two sentences are read together, the restriction on
judicial review can be fairly read to apply only to discretionary judgments; if read separately,
the restriction applies to “any action or decision.”
144 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. at 517 (“This Court has held that ‘where Congress intends to
preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear.’” (quoting
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988))). While a total of six justices agreed that the statute
did not rescind the LPR’s rights to judicial review, Kim lost his constitutional challenge to a
mandatory pre-hearing detention on the merits. See supra Part I.C.2.
145 Demore, 538 U.S. at 517.
146 Id. at 537 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The clarity of § 1226(e)'s text makes such a
question unavoidable, unlike in St. Cyr, where the Court invoked the doctrine of constitutional
doubt and interpreted the relevant provisions of AEDPA and IIRAIRA not to repeal habeas
jurisdiction.”).
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was inapplicable to any aliens.147 Thus, DeMore on the surface
supports an LPR’s right to judicial review of questions of law, but
Justice O’Connor’s dissent showed that the Suspension Clause’s
applicability, even to LPRs, was not fully resolved.
B. Enemy Combatants’ Statutory Right to
Judicial Review of Detention
Whereas St. Cyr and Demore wrestled with the availability of
habeas for LPRs, a line of Guantanamo Bay detention cases
considered whether habeas could be withheld from inadmissible
aliens. In Rasul v. Bush,148 the government argued that enemy
combatants had no right to habeas corpus. The Court avoided any
constitutional issue by holding that enemy combatants were entitled
to challenge their detention at Guantanamo Bay under the general
habeas statute.149 In Justice Kennedy’s noteworthy concurrence, the
extended nature of the detention was again a deciding factor.150
By restricting its ruling to the statutory habeas provisions of
section 2241, Rasul invited Congress to speak clearly regarding the
access of enemy combatants to habeas review. Congress wasted little
time. It passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (“DTA”)151 and
amended section 2241 to provide that “no court . . . shall have
jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas
corpus filed by . . . an alien detained . . . as an enemy
combatant . . . .”152 In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,153 the Supreme Court
nevertheless allowed Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Osama bin Laden’s
bodyguard and personal driver, to challenge his detention. Hamdan
had been in custody since 2001,154 and his case was pending when the
147 Id. at 537–39 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor stopped just short of
reaching a final conclusion, noting that the majority accepted jurisdiction and she agreed with
the majority’s decision on the merits. Id. at 540.
148 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
149 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3) (2006) (stating that “within their respective jurisdictions,”
federal courts have the authority to hear applications for habeas corpus by any person who
claims to be held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States”); see also Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485 (finding that the courts retained jurisdiction “to
determine the legality of the Executive's potentially indefinite detention” of Rasul and similarly
situated prisoners).
150 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 488 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In light of the status of Guantanamo
Bay and the indefinite pretrial detention of the detainees, I would hold that federal-court
jurisdiction is permitted in these cases.”).
151 Detainee Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 109–148, §§ 1001–1006, 119 Stat. 2739–2744
(2005).
152 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1).
153 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
154 Id. at 566.
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DTA was enacted.155 Because the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the statute concluded that the DTA’s habeas-corpus-stripping
provision was not intended to be retroactive,156 the provision did not
apply to Hamdan’s case. This reasoning allowed the Supreme Court
to uphold Hamdan’s right to judicial review under the general habeas
statute without deciding whether the Suspension Clause extended to
inadmissible aliens.157
C. The Suspension Clause Applies to Inadmissible Aliens
In response to the Hamdan ruling, Congress “quickly enacted the
Military Commissions Act, emphatically reasserting that [Congress]
did not want [Guantanamo] prisoners [to file] habeas petitions.”158
Enemy combatants filed petitions for habeas review of their
detention, and there was no longer a plausible reading of the habeas
statutes by which the Court could retain jurisdiction.159 In
Boumediene v. Bush, the Court was therefore forced to consider
whether enemy combatants had “the constitutional privilege of habeas
corpus” which could not “be withdrawn except in conformance with
the Suspension Clause.”160 Justice Kennedy concluded for the Court
that the Suspension Clause “protects the rights of the detained by
affirming the duty and authority of the Judiciary to call the jailer to
account”161 and “that at common law a petitioner’s status as an alien
was not a categorical bar to habeas corpus relief.”162
155 Id. at 576 (finding that the bar to judicial review did not apply to “this case, which was
pending at the time the DTA was enacted”).
156 Id. (rejecting the argument that “Congress' failure to expressly reserve federal courts’
jurisdiction over pending cases erects a presumption against jurisdiction” and that the
presumption is not rebutted by the text).
157 Id. at 575–76 (“We find it unnecessary to reach either of these [constitutional]
arguments. Ordinary principles of statutory construction suffice to rebut the Government's
theory—at least insofar as this case, which was pending at the time the DTA was enacted, is
concerned.”); see also Tung Yin, Tom and Jerry (and Spike): A Metaphor for Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, the President, the Court, and Congress in the War on Terrorism, 42 TULSA L. REV.
505, 511 (2007).
158 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2296 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159 Id. at 2244 (“[W]e agree with [the Court of Appeals’] conclusion that the MCA
deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction to entertain the habeas corpus actions now before
us.”).
160 Id. at 2240. The canon of constitutional avoidance can only be utilized when “after the
application of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found to be susceptible of more than one
construction; and the canon functions as a means of choosing between them.” Id. at 2271
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005)).
161 Id. at 2247.
162 Id. at 2248 (emphasis added). Finding that the United States has de facto sovereignty
over Guantanamo Bay, the Court rejected the government’s contention that the Suspension
Clause did not apply to aliens there. It found that the detainees were being “held in a territory
that, while technically not part of the United States, is under the complete and total control of
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Having determined that even inadmissible aliens were entitled to
Suspension Clause protections, the Court had to consider whether the
procedural protections mandated under the DTA provided adequate
safeguards, substituting for habeas procedures.163 It found three
particularly important procedural shortcomings in the statutorily
prescribed tribunals: (1) The aliens had only “limited means to find or
present evidence to challenge the Government’s case” against
them;164 (2) they would have a “personal representative,”165 but they
would “not have the assistance of counsel” at the tribunal;166 and
(3) they “may not be aware of the most critical allegations” upon
which their detention was based.167
The Court also considered whether prudential concerns required it
to defer to the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, which had been granted jurisdiction under the DTA to
review the constitutionality of the tribunal procedures.168 The Court
emphasized the importance of the length of detention and concluded
that because six years had elapsed “without the judicial oversight that
habeas corpus or an adequate substitute demands[,] . . . the costs of
delay can no longer be borne by those who are held in custody. The
detainees in these cases are entitled to a prompt habeas corpus
hearing.”169
D. The Significance of Boumediene
As the culmination of a decade of jurisprudence regarding the
constitutional rights of aliens to judicial review and freedom from
extended detention, Boumediene illustrates at least three Court
leanings. Most dramatically, the Supreme Court for the first time
afforded an inadmissible alien a substantive constitutional right.
Specifically, aliens who are inadmissible because they might be
terrorists or threats to national security had the right to judicial review
of their detention under the Suspension Clause. Conferring this

our Government.” Id. at 2262.
163 Id. at 2266 (“[W]e must interpret the DTA and assess its adequacy as a substitute for
habeas corpus.”).
164 Id. at 2269.
165 Id. at 2288 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the personal representative “may
review classified documents at the [tribunal] stage and summarize them for the detainee” and
that legal counsel would be provided later on appeal before the D.C. Circuit).
166 Id. at 2269.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 2274.
169 Id. at 2275.
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constitutional right on Guantanamo detainees, a small category of
inadmissible aliens, does not necessarily confer it upon all
inadmissible aliens. Nevertheless, this substantive constitutional right
should extend to some other inadmissible aliens.170 Since aliens
obtain greater rights and privileges as their ties to the community
become stronger,171 inadmissible aliens who live in the United States
arguably have at least as great a claim for habeas rights as enemy
combatants who never set foot on United States soil.
Additionally, as discussed above, the Court found the DTA’s
administrative proceedings deficient in their failure both to provide
legal counsel and to provide the alien a reasonable opportunity to
develop evidence to challenge the government’s allegations.172
Finally, the length of detention again appeared to be an important
factor in the Court’s willingness to assert its authority.
Finally, Boumediene calls into question foundational arguments in
the Mezei decision, and, therefore, weakens the “entry fiction,”
perhaps fatally.173 In Mezei, the most salient reasons for denying an
alien’s right to procedural due process were his status as an
inadmissible alien, the territorial ambiguity of Ellis Island as an
extension of the U.S. border, and the national security interests
involved. A fair application of Boumediene undermines all three of
these rationales. First, most inadmissible aliens facing indefinite
detention have actually lived in the United States and have a greater
claim to constitutional protections than an enemy combatant. Second,
the United States has de jure, not merely de facto, sovereignty over
Ellis Island and its detention centers.174 And, third, enemy combatants
pose at least as great a threat to national security as Knauff, Mezei, or
Hernandez–Carrera, the inadmissible alien who is the concern of this

170 See Slocum, supra note 65, at 1034 (“If the Court holds that the Guantanamo detainees
possess constitutional rights, however, the decision should compel lower courts to conclude that
(at least some) inadmissible aliens possess constitutional rights.”).
171 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950) (noting that an alien is “accorded
a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society”).
172 For an alien in DHS detention with poor English skills and limited education, the lack
of the first (legal representation) necessarily implicates the second (inability to develop
evidence).
173 See Slocum, supra note 65, at 1035–36 (expressing doubt that Boumediene will be
interpreted so expansively as to grant aliens a full panoply of constitutional rights, but
suggesting that it may minimally serve to weaken the entry fiction, and provide the basis to
accord inadmissible aliens the same substantive protections as lawful permanent residents
against indefinite detention).
174 Boumediene concluded that though the United States does not have de jure sovereignty
over Guantanamo Bay, its de facto sovereignty is sufficient for habeas corpus rights to apply.
128 S. Ct. at 2253.
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Note.175 By undermining the foundations of Mezei, Boumediene poses
a direct challenge to the continued vitality of the “entry fiction” in
denying constitutional protections to inadmissible aliens. As the entry
fiction is a foundational legal construct for denying constitutional
rights to aliens, to weaken or end the entry fiction is to open the door
to explicit recognition of a panoply of constitutional rights for aliens.
The Supreme Court’s rulings in St. Cyr, Demore, and Boumediene,
when considered alongside Zadvydas, affirm that lawful permanent
residents and some inadmissible aliens are protected by the
Constitution when they face prolonged detention. Because the DHS’s
indefinite-detention regulation falls outside the narrowed ambit of
plenary power,176 the Supreme Court should assert its authority and
insist that the DHS respect the due process rights of aliens facing
indefinite detention. The remaining question to resolve is whether
those due process rights require the government to abandon its
indefinite-detention regulation.
III. THE INDEFINITE-DETENTION REGULATION AND DUE PROCESS
This Part reviews the constitutional protections enjoyed by citizens
facing civil commitment, compares these protections to those
provided to non-citizens by the DHS indefinite-detention regulation,
and considers whether the DHS regulation violates non-citizens’
constitutional rights. Zadvydas recognized the close parallels between
civil commitment and the earlier DHS indefinite-detention statute.177
Both allowed open-ended deprivation of liberty outside the context of
criminal punishment, and both pose serious constitutional questions.
Less than thirty days after Zadvydas was decided, the Attorney
General ordered legacy INS “to develop regulations to address . . .
special circumstances . . . such as . . . especially dangerous
individuals,” and he required that the regulations “provide
constitutionally sufficient procedural protections.”178 The result was
175 It is beyond the scope of this Note, however, to consider the indefinite detention of
aliens posing a national security threat under 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(d).
176 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f) only applies to lawful permanent residents and inadmissible aliens
for whom removal is not possible. Their detention, however, serves no government interest
related to deportation or exclusion. Boumediene similarly involved aliens outside this ambit, as
enemy combatants seek to return home, not to enter the United States.
177 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“[T]his Court has said that
government detention violates [the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause] unless the detention
is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural protections or, in certain special
and “narrow” nonpunitive “circumstances,” where a special justification, such as harmthreatening mental illness, outweighs the “individual's constitutionally protected interest in
avoiding physical restraint.”) (citations omitted, emphasis in original).
178 Notice of Memorandum, 66 Fed. Reg. 38433–34 (July 19, 2001).
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the indefinite-detention regulation under which Hernandez–Carrera is
presently held. The regulation functions like a state or federal civil
commitment statute in that it defines the process for determining
when someone who is mentally ill should be subject to prolonged
detention. The Supreme Court’s civil commitment cases along with
the state and federal statutes they spawned therefore provide a
standard against which to assess the constitutional validity of the
indefinite-detention regulation.179 That regulation’s procedures are
markedly inferior to those that protect citizens, and the Supreme
Court could invalidate the indefinite-detention regulation based on
these procedural shortcomings. Nevertheless, in the absence of a clear
precedent upon which to conclusively gauge the level of procedural
due process due to aliens, the Court is not compelled to find the
regulation is unconstitutional.
Kansas v. Hendricks180 provides the most frequently cited analysis
of long-term civil commitment. Upholding commitment under the
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act,181 the Court repeated its prior
holding that “[a]n individual's constitutionally protected liberty
interest in avoiding physical restraint may be overridden” in the case
of persons who are “unable to control their behavior and thereby pose
a danger to the public health and safety.”182 The Court identified three
requirements for such civil detention. First, confinement must take
“place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards”;
second, there must be a finding of “dangerousness either to one’s self
or to others”; and third, the proof of dangerousness must be “coupled
. . . with the proof of some additional factor, such as ‘mental illness’
or ‘mental abnormality.’”183 These elements indicate the contours of
both substantive and procedural due process requirements for a civil
commitment statute.
A. Substantive Due Process Requirements for Civil Commitment
The Court first held in Foucha v. Louisiana184 that indefinite civil
detention violates substantive due process regardless of the
179 Zadvydas itself relied on the Supreme Court’s civil commitment jurisprudence to assess
the constitutional problems inherent in indefinitely detaining aliens. 533 U.S. at 690.
180 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
181 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (2005) (providing for the civil commitment of persons
convicted of a sexually violent crime who are “likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence
if not treated for their mental abnormality or personality disorder”).
182 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356–57.
183 Id. at 357–58. These three elements were later parsed from Hendricks by Kansas v.
Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409–10 (2002).
184 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
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procedures used unless the individual is found to be both mentally ill
and dangerous.185 Four years after a man was found not guilty by
reason of insanity and committed to a psychiatric hospital, a hospital
review board recommended his release. Even though Foucha had
previously “manifested the reality of anti-social conduct,”186 he had a
substantive due process right to freedom unless he was both
“mentally ill and dangerous.”187 Hendricks explained that the mental
illness requirement could be satisfied by “a ‘mental abnormality’ or
‘personality disorder’ that makes it ‘difficult, if not impossible, for
the [dangerous] person to control his dangerous behavior.’”188 In
Kansas v. Crane,189 the Court clarified that civil commitment
proceedings must include “a lack of control determination.”190
Specifically, the Court emphasized that “there must be proof of
serious difficulty in controlling behavior.”191 Civil commitment,
therefore, does not offend a detainee’s substantive due process right
to be free from prolonged detention when (1) the detainee is
dangerous and (2) he has a mental illness or mental abnormality that
creates a serious difficulty in controlling behavior.
The government’s current indefinite-detention regulation meets
both prongs of this substantive due process exception. To be detained
under the DHS regulation, an Immigration Judge must find that:
(i) [t]he alien has previously committed one or more
crimes of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. 16;192
185 See id. at 79–80 (emphasizing that the testimony in the case did not establish that
Foucha was suffering from a mental illness, and that therefore Due Process required the State to
establish the grounds for his confinement).
186 Id. at 110 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.2d 589, 604 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (Leventhal, J., concurring)).
187 Id. at 80 (opinion of the Court) (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 362
(1983)). The Court in Foucha held that “the Due Process Clause contains a substantive
component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions.” Id. (quoting Zinermon v.
Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)). Foucha noted, however, that in addition to incarcerating
criminals, “[t]he State may also confine a mentally ill person if it shows ‘by clear and
convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill and dangerous.’” Id. (quoting Jones, 463
U.S. at 362).
188 521 U.S. at 358 (citing Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a02(b) (1994)).
189 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
190 Id. at 412 (“We do not agree with the State, however, insofar as it seeks to claim that
the Constitution permits commitment of the type of dangerous sexual offender considered in
Hendricks without any lack-of-control determination.”).
191 Id. at 413. Lower courts have generally concluded, “[a] fair reading of Crane, however,
requires no explicit finding [of lack of ability to control dangerous behavior] as long as the
evidence presented proves ‘serious difficulty in controlling behavior.’” Richard S. v. Carpinello,
589 F.3d 75, 85 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Crane, 534 U.S. at 413).
192 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2006) (“The term ‘crime of violence’ means—(a) an offense that has as
an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or
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(ii) [d]ue to a mental condition or personality disorder and
behavior associated with that condition or disorder, the alien
is likely to engage in acts of violence in the future; and
(iii) [n]o conditions of release can reasonably be expected
to ensure the safety of the public.193
Though the earlier indefinite-detention regulation detaining all
inadmissible aliens and lawful residents created serious constitutional
problems in its expansiveness, the new regulation avoids the
problems by restricting detention to aliens who are both mentally ill
and dangerous.194 Based on Foucha, as interpreted by Hendricks and
Crane, the DHS regulation satisfies substantive due process.
B. Procedural Due Process
1. Constitutional Requirements for Civil Commitment
In Addington v. Texas195 the Court asserted, “civil commitment for
any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that
requires due process protection.”196 Due to the risk of error in making
a commitment determination, the Court insisted that the government’s
burden of proof be greater than a preponderance of the evidence,197
and it set “clear and convincing evidence” as the minimum standard
for all civil commitment cases.198
As to whether an administrative hearing is sufficient for civil
commitment, virtually every state requires a formal judicial
hearing.199 The Adam Walsh Act, which authorizes civil commitment

property of another, or (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the
course of committing the offense.”).
193 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f)(1)(i)–(iii) (2010).
194 Hernandez–Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1253 (10th Cir. 2008).
195 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
196 Id. at 425.
197 Id. at 427 (“The individual should not be asked to share equally with society the risk of
error when the possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than any possible harm to
the state. We conclude that the individual's interest in the outcome of a civil commitment
proceeding is of such weight and gravity that due process requires the state to justify
confinement by proof more substantial than a mere preponderance of the evidence.”).
198 Id. at 433 (“[T]he ‘clear and convincing’ standard . . . is required to meet due process
guarantees . . . .”).
199 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27:10 (West 2010) (defining New Jersey court
proceedings which must precede involuntary commitment); N.Y. MENT. HYG. LAW § 9.31
(McKinney 2006) (requiring judicial review within sixty days of any civil commitment of a
person in New York); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.38 (West 2010) (making judicial review
available in Ohio “upon written request by any [civilly committed individual], his guardian, or
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of a sexually dangerous person currently in federal prison, also
requires a judicial hearing.200 Though the Supreme Court has not
explicitly made such a finding, “[t]here is no longer any serious
question as to the constitutional requirement of some kind of a
judicial hearing prior to an order of involuntary civil commitment.”201
The Supreme Court has not directly ruled on a free person’s right
to court-appointed counsel prior to civil commitment, but it has
answered a related question. In Vitek v. Jones,202 the Supreme Court
considered whether Nebraska could transfer an indigent prisoner to a
mental institution without affording him access to counsel. The Court
pointed out that Jones was due less protection than a free citizen
because his conviction had extinguished his right to freedom from
confinement for the duration of his sentence.203 Nevertheless, four
justices recognized a categorical requirement for court-appointed
counsel, and Justice Powell’s concurrence decided the issue.204 He
held that qualified and independent assistance must be provided, but
that it need not be an attorney in all situations.205 Crucial to the
Court’s reasoning, according to Justice Powell, was that a person
“threatened with involuntary transfer to mental hospitals will
[unlikely] possess the competence or training to protect adequately
his own interest.”206
Though the Supreme Court has not decided whether a free person
has a per se guarantee of counsel in civil commitment proceedings,
the Second Circuit has resolved the question affirmatively. In Project

the chief clinical officer to the probate court”); see also RALPH REISNER, ET AL., LAW AND THE
MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 781–86 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing
the significant differences among the states with regard to the burden of proof required at the
civil commitment hearings, as well as the role and composition of the ultimate decisionmaker).
200 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a) (2006).
201 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, LAW AND MENTAL DISABILITY 60 (1994).
202 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
203 See id. at 492 (“Were an ordinary citizen to be subjected involuntarily to these
consequences, it is undeniable that protected liberty interests would be unconstitutionally
infringed absent compliance with the procedures required by the Due Process Clause.”).
204 See id. at 497 (Powell, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority that an inmate whom
the State wishes to transfer indefinitely to a mental health institution is entitled to some form of
representation).
205 Id. (“I do not agree, however, that the requirement of independent assistance demands
that a licensed attorney be provided.”). Justice Powell identified two factors to decide if counsel
should be required: “(i) the existence of factual disputes or issues which are ‘complex or
otherwise difficult to develop or present,’ and (ii) ‘whether the probationer appears to be
capable of speaking effectively for himself.’” Id. at 498 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790–91 (1973)).
206 Id. at 498.
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Release v. Prevost,207 the Second Circuit reviewed the constitutional
adequacy of New York’s civil commitment procedures. It concluded
that a “right to counsel in civil commitment proceedings may be
gleaned from the Supreme Court's recognition that commitment
involves a substantial curtailment of liberty and thus requires due
process protection.”208 The Second Circuit, therefore, has filled a gap
in the Supreme Court’s civil commitment jurisprudence by affirming
a person’s right to counsel at a civil commitment judicial hearing.
Constitutional protections from civil commitment of citizens have
been well established. The Supreme Court clearly stated that
involuntary civil commitment is “a massive curtailment of liberty,”209
and that the burden is on the government to show mental illness and
dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence. Courts and
commentators agree that due process requires a judicial hearing and,
for the indigent, court-appointed counsel. It is illustrative to compare
these three protections with those provided by the DHS under 8
C.F.R. § 241.14(f)-(h).
2. Shortcomings of the DHS Indefinite-Detention Regulation
Consistent with constitutional requirements, the DHS regulation
places the burden of proof on the government to show by “clear and
convincing evidence” that “[d]ue to a mental condition or personality
disorder and behavior associated with that condition or disorder, the
alien is likely to engage in acts of violence in the future; and [n]o
conditions of release can reasonably be expected to ensure the safety
of the public.”210 The regulation’s shortcomings, however, are
significant. The merits hearing is administrative, not judicial, so the
detainee is without the protection of customary rules of evidence and
procedure.211 Indigent detainees are not provided counsel,212 and,

207 722

F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983).
at 976.
209 Vitek, 445 U.S. at 491 (quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972)).
210 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.14(f)(1), (i)(1) (2010).
211 In Hernandez–Carrera v. Carlson, the Tenth Circuit argued that due process is satisfied
by the availability of judicial review at the appellate court level. 547 F.3d 1237, 1255 (10th Cir.
2008) (“This is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause.”). As discussed
in Part II, however, IIRAIRA stripped away review of discretionary and factual findings, thus
preventing the alien from challenging the dangerousness finding unless in some way the
“commissioner of immigration is exceeding his power.” Id. (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.
289, 306 (2001)).
212 If free immigration detention legal services are available in the area, the detainee will
be provided a list of such services, 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(g)(3)(i), but there is no assurance that the
services will be forthcoming.
208 Id.
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though the government must use an expert witness, 213 there is no
provision for an indigent detainee to be provided independent expert
testimony.214
The lack of counsel and expert testimony are major obstacles to an
immigration judge’s fact finding. Aliens in DHS detention often have
poor English skills, limited education, and heavily constrained access
to the outside world.215 Consequently, they have almost no
opportunity to prepare meaningful evidence to rebut the government’s
contentions of dangerousness. The importance of being able to
prepare a defense was underscored by Boumediene.216 There, the
enemy combatant’s inability to develop evidence was among three
identified deficiencies that required the Court to reject the Detainee
Treatment Act’s procedures.217 Cut off from the outside world, the
lack of counsel makes it virtually impossible for the alien to mount
even a nominal defense.
The DHS regulation’s protections of aliens would be
constitutionally deficient if applied to a citizen due to their failure to
require a judicial hearing and guarantee access to counsel. These
shortcomings are not merely theoretical, but seriously undermine the
alien’s ability to protect himself from unnecessary indefinite
detention. Boumediene suggests that these deficiencies may make the
DHS regulation constitutionally unacceptable even in the context of
an alien’s protection.

3. Alternative to the DHS Indefinite-Detention Regulation
It would not be a burden on the DHS to remedy these deficiencies.
The primary purpose of the DHS indefinite-detention regulation is to
protect the public.218 Prior to the completion of the alien’s criminal
213 The government is required to commission a report by a Public Health Services
physician based on a physical and mental examination of the detainee. 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f)(3).
The report must make a recommendation “whether, due to a mental condition or personality
disorder and behavior associated with that condition or disorder, the alien is likely to engage in
acts of violence in the future.” Id. Of note is that the likelihood “to engage in acts of violence” is
not conditioned upon the absence or presence of DHS-imposed release conditions.
214 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.14(f)–(h). The DHS regulation also provides no requirement that the
detainee receive treatment to rehabilitate him and return him to health so that he may return to
society. Id.
215 See, e.g., Cheryl Little, INS Detention in Florida, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 551,
567 (1999) (“Detainees' ability to make telephone calls to lawyers or to their families for
assistance in their cases is severely restricted.”).
216 See supra Part II.C.
217 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2269–70 (2008).
218 See Notice of Memorandum, 66 Fed. Reg. 38433 (July 19, 2001). The Attorney General
ordered legacy INS to draft the regulation as part of efforts to “ensure that we take all
responsible steps to protect the public.” Id.
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sentence, the DHS could complete removal proceedings, issue its
formal removal order, and coordinate travel documents with the
alien’s home country. At the completion of his sentence, the DHS
could promptly remove him. If, as is the case with Hernandez–
Carrera, the country has no extradition agreement or is otherwise
unwilling to accept him, then upon the expiration of his prison
sentence, the DHS could release him subject to supervision. If the
DHS has concerns about the alien’s mental illness and future
dangerousness, it could notify state authorities well in advance of the
alien’s release. To preserve public safety, the state could institute the
same civil commitment proceedings as it would if the alien were a
mentally ill citizen completing a criminal sentence.219
There are several practical reasons for the DHS to proceed in this
fashion and turn over a potentially dangerous post-removal-order
alien to the appropriate state civil commitment regime. The states
presumably have greater experience and expertise than the DHS
whose primary mission is to apprehend and remove inadmissible
aliens, not detain them. Moreover, the states have better procedural
protections and a more developed jurisprudence that would reduce the
risk of imprisoning an alien unnecessarily at substantial government
expense.220 The states would also provide better rehabilitative
services,221 helping return the alien to a productive life.
It is arguably more efficient, more reliable, and less costly to allow
states to retain control over non-removable and potentially dangerous
aliens at the end of their criminal sentence. Just because it is smarter,
however, does not necessarily mean that it is constitutionally
compelled. Nor does the DHS regulation’s failure to provide a
judicial hearing and the guarantee of counsel necessarily violate due
process. Though the DHS regulations would be constitutionally
219 For example, if Hernandez–Carrera today was completing a Kansas prison sentence for
sexual assault, and it was feared he would pose a threat of violence upon his release, the DHS
could leave him in Kansas custody. Ninety days before the end of his prison sentence, the
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act would require a psychiatric evaluation and judicial
hearing to determine if civil commitment was necessary. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03 (2005).
If there were no Kansas act, the Adams Walsh Act would fill the gap, again requiring both a
psychiatric evaluation and judicial hearing with full procedural protections. Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a) (2006).
220 The DHS detention budget for the 2010 fiscal year is $1.7 billion. National Immigration
Forum, The Math of Immigration Detention, BACKGROUNDER 1 (July 7, 2009), available at
http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/MathofImmigrationDetention.pdf.
221 See, e.g., Riddhi Mukhopadhyay, Death in Detention: Medical and Mental Health
Consequences of Indefinite Detention of Immigrants in the United States, 7 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC.
JUST. 693, 694 (2009) (“On any given day, there are over thirty thousand immigrants placed in
privately run detention facilities around the country who are unable to access appropriate
medical and mental health support or services.”).
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deficient if they governed citizens, the regulations may still satisfy
due process for non-citizens.222 Landon v. Plasencia223 provided a
framework for evaluating what process may be due to a non-citizen.
C. Application of Eldridge Analysis
“The Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Landon v. Plasencia
marked the arrival of the due process revolution in immigration
law.”224 Plasencia was an LPR taken into custody while reentering the
country after helping several aliens enter the country unlawfully.
During the process to remove her from the United States, the DHS
denied her the procedural protections normally afforded an LPR being
deported. Instead, it allowed her only the protections available to an
inadmissible alien in “exclusion” hearings. In Plasencia, the Court
applied the due process analysis of Mathews v. Eldridge225 to assess
whether the procedural protections available in an exclusion hearing
were constitutionally sufficient for an LPR. 226 Because Plasencia had
been caught smuggling, the Court determined that she was not
entitled to the protections typically available to an LPR. Nevertheless,
the Court insisted that the exclusion hearing procedures might still be
inadequate.227
Plasencia’s significance was twofold: it explicitly recognized an
alien’s constitutional right to procedural due process;228 and it
implicitly recognized the applicability of the Eldridge procedural due
process analysis to regulations concerning aliens. Eldridge has been
criticized for undervaluing individual rights,229 but it has the
222 See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 (1976) (“The fact that all persons, aliens and
citizens alike, are protected by the Due Process Clause does not lead to the further conclusion
that all aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship . . . .”).
223 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
224 Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates
for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1652 (1992) (footnote omitted)
(observing that Landon v. Plasencia was the first case in which a court used procedural due
process arguments to protect aliens’ substantive constitutional rights).
225 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Justice Powell's opinion in Mathews v. Eldridge is “the
cornerstone for all analysis of procedural adequacy.” 32 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & CHARLES
H. KOCH, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 8129(a) (2006).
226 Landon v. Plasencia recognized Eldridge as providing the appropriate framework by
which to evaluate Plasencia’s procedural challenges. 459 U.S. at 34.
227 Because the impact of the deficiencies and the burden on the government of curing
them had not been briefed, the Court declined to reach a conclusion, instead remanding the
question to the lower court. Id. at 37.
228
See supra note 73, and accompanying text.
229 See Jim Rosenfeld, Deportation Proceedings and Due Process of Law, 26 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 713, 740 (1995) (asserting that the Eldridge analysis “ignores the inherent
value of individual rights”).
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flexibility to adapt to harsh governmental action like that of the
indefinite-detention regulation. Judge Friendly explained,
“Deprivation of liberty . . . is the harshest action the state can
take against the individual through the administrative process.
The Supreme Court thus was right in demanding a very high
level of procedural protection . . . . Civil commitment
warrants a similarly high [level of procedural protection.]”230
Protecting immigrants from the “harshest action the state can take”
with only watered-down procedures should invoke healthy
skepticism.
In Eldridge, the Court created a three-factor balancing test to
evaluate whether administrative procedures conform to due process.
In evaluating the procedures in any case, the courts must
consider [1] the interest at stake for the individual, [2] the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of the interest through the
procedures used as well as the probable value of additional or
different procedural safeguards, and [3] the interest of the
government in using the current procedures rather than
additional or different procedures.231
Both the second and third factors of the Eldridge test require a
comparison of the challenged procedures to “different or additional
procedures.” For the purpose of applying the Eldridge analysis to the
DHS regulation, the “different or additional procedures” compared in
this Note are those proposed in Part III.B.3. At the completion of an
alien’s criminal prison sentence, if his home country will not accept
him and there are concerns about his dangerousness, he is left in the
custody of the state or federal authority. The alien is then subject to
the same civil commitment regime (and attendant protections) as a
citizen. The second and third parts of the Eldridge analysis therefore
compare the procedures of the DHS indefinite-detention regulation to
the civil commitment procedures and protections provided to citizens
under state and federal statutes.
The first factor of the Eldridge analysis, “the interest at stake for
the individual,” weighs heavily for the detained alien who faces the
prospect of indefinite detention. Short of capital punishment, it is hard
to imagine an interest that is weightier than indefinite loss of freedom.
The second factor, “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest
230 Henry

J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing”, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1296 (1975).
459 U.S. at 34 (citing Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334–35).

231 Plasencia,
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. . . [and] the probable value of additional or different procedural
safeguards” assesses the increased risk of unnecessary detention
under the current DHS procedures as compared to state or federal
civil commitment procedures. The additional risk is significant. That
all states and the federal Adam Walsh Act require both a judicial
hearing and court-appointed counsel in civil commitment proceedings
indicates the importance of these safeguards and the risk created by
their absence. The first and second factors therefore both weigh
heavily against the constitutional adequacy of the DHS procedures.
As to the third factor, “the interest of the government,” Plasencia
shows how the Court could weigh the government’s interest in the
existing DHS procedures.232 In Plasencia, the Court recognized two
government interests: the Court’s tradition of plenary power233 and its
avoidance of an “undue burden.”234 Both concerns are considerably
less weighty here than in Plasencia. First, Plasencia was being denied
entry into the country—a government action in which plenary power
deference is strongest.235 In contrast, as noted by both Zadvydas and
Demore, post-removal-order detention is outside the ambit of plenary
power because it does not involve exclusion or deportation.236
Moreover, Boumediene and Zadvydas demonstrate the Court’s
readiness to challenge the political branches where non-removal
detention of aliens becomes prolonged. The concern about plenary
power would therefore have little or no weight.
Efficient administration of immigration law is also a less serious
concern here than it was in Plasencia. In that case, a decision that
more process was required would have required that legacy INS
institute additional procedures before excluding any LPR, thus
dramatically increasing the government’s workload. In contrast, if
aliens in Hernandez–Carrera’s situation were simply turned over to
state and federal civil commitment authorities, the DHS would be
freed of an administrative burden for which it has less expertise and
232 Plasencia,

459 U.S. at 34.
(“The Government's interest in efficient administration of the immigration laws at
the border also is weighty. Further, it must weigh heavily in the balance that control over
matters of immigration is a sovereign prerogative, largely within the control of the Executive
and the Legislature.”).
234 Id. at 36.
235 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (creating the plenary power
doctrine in a case where a returning lawful permanent resident was denied reentry to the United
States).
236 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 527 (2003) (justifying the Court’s deference to Congress
in a pre-removal detention statute by distinguishing Zadvydas in which indefinite detention “did
not serve its purported immigration purpose” since “removal was ‘no longer practically
attainable.’” (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001))).
233 Id.
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experience. Consequently, the third Eldridge factor, the DHS’s
interest in retaining its existing procedures, deserves significantly less
weight here than in Plasencia.
That the first two Eldridge factors weigh heavily in favor of the
individual alien, and that the third factor weighs relatively lightly for
the government may seem to imply that the DHS regulation provides
constitutionally insufficient process. This is not, however, a necessary
conclusion.
D. Creating a Procedural Due Process Benchmark
The Supreme Court has implied on numerous occasions that
aliens, even lawful permanent residents, may be entitled to less due
process protection than a citizen.237 If aliens are entitled to less
process, then the Court can give less weight to the individual’s
interests or greater weight to the government’s interests. The pivotal
unanswered question is how much more or less weight.238 If
Plasencia had definitively decided that exclusion protections were
insufficient for Plasencia, the Court would have provided a
touchstone for future due process evaluations. In Plasencia, however,
the government had not briefed the Court on the burden that would be
created by remedying the procedural deficiencies.239 Rather than
unilaterally define minimal procedural protections based on
incomplete information, the Court remanded the case.240 If, as argued
by Justice Marshall in his concurrence, the Court had taken the extra
step and found the exclusion procedures constitutionally defective,241
it would have created a benchmark for immigrant due process. Future
courts could compare the governmental and individual interests in
237 See, e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 694; Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32–34; Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950).
238 The only other Supreme Court case applying the Eldridge due process analysis to aliens
was Boumediene. There, the majority used the first two factors of the Eldridge analysis to
invalidate the procedural protections provided by the DTA’s statutory proceedings, but it never
discussed the third factor. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2267–68 (2008). The dissent
reached a different conclusion in part by noting the government’s interest in not burdening its
war-making responsibilities. Id. at 2288 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
239 459 U.S. at 37 n.9.
240 Id. at 37. Landon v. Plasencia prompted a dialogue between Congress and the Supreme
Court, which ultimately resulted in the 1996 IIRAIRA conflation of deportation and exclusion
procedural protections, thus vindicating Plasencia’s insistence on greater protections for
exclusion. Kevin R. Johnson, Maria and Joseph Plasencia’s Lost Weekend: The Case of Landon
v. Plasencia, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 221, 240 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds.,
2005).
241 459 U.S. at 38 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The Court has already set out the standards
to be applied in resolving the question. Therefore, rather than just remand, I would first hold that
respondent was denied due process. . . .”).
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Plasencia to the ones before the court. As discussed above, the
government’s interest in retaining the indefinite-detention regulation
is less weighty than its interest was in Plasencia, and the individual’s
interest in striking it down is considerably stronger. If Plasencia had
provided a determinative ruling, one might with certainty conclude
that Eldridge compels the Court to invalidate the procedures of the
DHS indefinite-detention regulation. Absent any precedential
benchmark, however, the Court is not compelled to find the DHS
regulation constitutionally invalid.
This Note invites the Supreme Court to use the DHS indefinitedetention regulation as a first step in establishing such a benchmark
for due process. As the individual’s interests are extreme, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of liberty is significant, and the
government’s interest in efficiency is minimal, the Eldridge analysis
easily leads to such a conclusion. As Justice Kennedy, the probable
fifth justice in such a case, has expressed particular concern with
extended detention and insufficient due process, there is some reason
to hope that the Court will choose such a path.
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION
This Part considers whether constitutional guarantees of equal
protection require that an alien have the same protection from
indefinite detention as a citizen. Indigent citizens with mental illness
who are completing prison terms for violent crimes are subject to civil
commitment only after a judicial review finds that they pose a serious
danger to the public.242 Under existing federal and state statutes, they
will also have access to counsel.243 A similarly situated alien may be
committed after an administrative review during which he has no
access to counsel.244 A clear disparity in procedural protections exists.
Equal protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments may
apply to the disparate application of statutory procedural protections
to different classes of persons.245 It is nevertheless unlikely that equal
242 See supra note 202 and accompanying text describing representative civil commitment
requirements for judicial review.
243 See supra Part III.B.1.
244 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.14(g)–(i) (2010) (omitting a right to an attorney).
245 See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (striking down as an equal
protection violation an Illinois statute which effectively separated persons bringing unjust
termination claims before the state’s Fair Employment Practices Commission into two groups,
giving force to claims the state processed within 120 days and allowing no recourse for claims
whose processing was delayed); see also, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)
(“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection component
prohibiting the United States from invidiously discriminating between individuals or groups.”).
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protection will compel relief for the disparate protections afforded
aliens facing “civil commitment” under the DHS indefinite-detention
regulation.
Equal protection applies only to disparate treatment by the same
governmental sovereign.246 Consequently, it does not prohibit
disparate treatment under a federal regulation such as section
241.14(f) and a state regulation providing greater protections to
citizens. It is conceivable that an alien finishing a federal sentence for
a violent sex crime and then detained under the DHS indefinitedetention regulation, could bring an equal protection challenge. He
would have a valid claim of disparate treatment under federal
regulations. The scenario, however, is unlikely. Of the challenges to
the DHS regulation that reached the circuit courts, none involved an
alien convicted of a violent crime under federal law.247
Even if such a case emerged, aliens making an equal protection
claim have a high threshold when challenging disparate treatment
under federal law. In Mathews v. Diaz, the foundational equal
protection case for aliens challenging federal statutes, the Supreme
Court required only a rational basis analysis to justify discrimination
against aliens.248 Medicare benefits were denied to inadmissible aliens
and LPRs with fewer than five years of residency.249 The Court
recognized the federal government’s legitimate interest in protecting
the program’s fiscal integrity by denying Medicare to some lawful
permanent residents. It also found that inadmissible immigrants could
not advance “even a colorable constitutional claim” to the bounty of a
nation.250 The Court reasoned that because the federal government’s
immigration-and-naturalization authority gave it deportation power
over aliens that is unavailable over citizens, discriminating between

246 Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633–34 (1996) (holding that for the purposes of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the state of Colorado and its political
subdivisions are a single sovereign and must be impartial to all who seek their assistance).
247 These cases include: Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478 (5th Cir. 2008) (Louisiana law);
Hernandez–Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2008) (Kansas law); Tuan Thai v.
Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2004) (Washington law); Rosales–Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d
386 (6th Cir. 2003) (Kentucky law); Borrero v. Aljets, 325 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir. 2003)
(Minnesota law); Benitez v. Wallis, 337 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Clark v.
Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005) (Florida law); Xi v. INS, 298 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2002) (federal
smuggling law); Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000) (Washington law); and Zadvydas v.
Underdown, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999) (New York law).
248 426 U.S. 67, 83 (1976) (justifying the requirement that federal Medicare benefits be
restricted to LPRs with at least five years of residency on the basis that “neither requirement is
wholly irrational”).
249 Id. at 71.
250 Id. at 80.
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citizens and aliens is not necessarily invidious, even if the alien has
lawful resident status.251
It is highly unlikely that an alien, whether an LPR or an
inadmissible alien, could successfully challenge disparate treatment
under a rational basis analysis. In the case of an illegal alien,
providing less robust procedural protections from indefinite detention
might rationally serve the government’s interest in deterring the flow
of unlawful immigration.252 In the case of a lawful permanent
resident, lesser due process protections might rationally serve the
government’s legitimate interest in inducing aliens to naturalize.
Because equal protection jurisprudence requires only a rational
basis for treating citizens and aliens differently under federal law,
there is little reason to expect that the Supreme Court would strike
down the DHS indefinite-detention regulation on equal protection
grounds.253
V. POLICY REASONS FOR INVALIDATING DHS
INDEFINITE-DETENTION REGULATION
As concluded above in Parts III and IV, the Supreme Court is not
compelled to strike down the DHS indefinite-detention regulation on
either due process or equal protection grounds. Nevertheless, a future
challenge to this regulation may provide the Court the opportunity to
complete the work it left unfinished in Plasencia. Plasencia and
Eldridge provide the Court ample room to strike down the indefinitedetention regulation and establish a benchmark for evaluating the
procedural sufficiency of other regulations governing aliens. Part V
outlines two policy reasons why the Supreme Court should do so;
and, if it does not, why Congress should clarify that section 241.14(f)
does not authorize indefinite detention.

251 Id. (“The exclusion of aliens and the reservation of the power to deport have no
permissible counterpart in the Federal Government's power to regulate the conduct of its own
citizenry. The fact that an Act of Congress treats aliens differently from citizens does not in
itself imply that such disparate treatment is ‘invidious.’” (footnotes omitted)).
252 See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151 (2002) (upholding
the punitive denial of back pay to an illegal alien fired in violation of NLRB regulations as a
permissible deterrent to illegal immigration).
253 It is beyond the scope of this Note to argue that the Supreme Court should revise its
equal protection jurisprudence and require federal discrimination against LPRs to withstand
strict scrutiny, as state discrimination is required to do.
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A. Simple Fairness and Humanity
First, simple fairness and humanity require it. Fairness in
government action is a core American value.254 Stringent procedural
safeguards are built into the United States criminal justice system
because the consequences of criminal convictions are potentially
severe.255 Citizens facing the possibility of civil commitment are
protected by rigorous due process.256 Such protections of liberty are
enshrined in the Constitution; and “fundamental fairness” is
guaranteed to all persons under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.257 Nevertheless, twenty-five million United States
immigrants—our neighbors and friends—may be deprived of basic
liberty protections without the most basic judicial protections.258
Aliens may be subjected to indefinite detention under section
241.14(f) without the benefit of a judicial hearing or court-provided
counsel.259 Justice Field wrote that “[a]s to its cruelty, nothing can
exceed a forcible deportation from a country of one's residence, and
the breaking up of all the relations of friendship, family and
business.”260 Yet, that cruelty is exacted upon long-time alien
members of our communities as a routine matter, often over the
period of just a few days by the mere action of an administrative
254 See Daniel Yankelovich, How Changes in the Economy Are Reshaping American
Values, in VALUES AND PUBLIC POLICY 16, 23 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1994) (listing
fairness and equality of opportunity as among America’s core values).
255 See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric
Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 473 (2007) (pointing
out the dangers of importing criminal justice norms into immigration law ).
256 See supra Part III.B.1.
257 Pedersen v. S. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 677 F.2d 312, 317 (3d Cir. 1982)
(“Essentially, fundamental fairness is what due process means.” (citing Mullane v. Cent.
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950))).
258 Approximately half are lawful permanent residents and half are illegal aliens. Nancy
Rytina, Estimates of the Legal Permanent Resident Population in 2008, Population Estimates,
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS (Oct. 2009), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_lpr_pe_2008.pdf.
Some
commentators have suggested that the sheer number and rootedness of illegal immigrants in our
society and national economy argue for a new approach to their rights relative to those of lawful
permanent residents. See Jason H. Lee, Unlawful Status as a “Constitutional Irrelevancy”?: The
Equal Protection Rights of Illegal Immigrants, 39 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1, 30 (2008) (“The
claim that illegal immigrants should receive the same level of equal protection of the laws as
legal immigrants gains further, normative support from the application of a participation model
of rights. . . . [This model] is premised on the idea that membership in a community is what
matters morally when it comes to the distribution of most Constitutional protections and
government benefits.”).
259 Detainees are allowed to be represented at no cost to the government, and, in cities
where pro bono services exist, detainees are given a list of free legal service providers. See 8
C.F.R. § 241.14(g)(3)(i). However, there is no assurance that such services will be available.
260 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 759 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting).
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hearing in which the alien has no representation.261 Mentally ill
persons subject to the DHS regulation are, despite their
dangerousness, among the most vulnerable in the population. They
suffer from a debility over which they have little or no control. To
imprison them for life with little or no medical treatment262 and
without the procedural protections provided to citizens, is ignoble and
beneath the ideals of this nation.263
B. The Risk of Further Entrenching an Underclass of Aliens
Second, judicially or legislatively invalidating the DHS indefinitedetention regulation is a small but necessary step in dismantling a
two-tiered system of constitutional rights. Disparate treatment of the
profoundly mentally ill is but part of a larger societal trend whereby
the nation has pushed immigrants into the shadows. President George
W. Bush correctly observed, “illegal immigrants live in the shadows
of our society. . . . [T]he vast majority . . . are decent people who
work hard, support their families, practice their faith, and lead
responsible lives. They are part of American life, but they are beyond
the reach and protection of American law.”264 Nor are illegal
261 During the first six months of 2009, more than two-thirds of the over 1,600 removals
presided over by the Cleveland Immigration Court were pro se. Dep’t of Justice, Executive
Office of Immigration Review, Cleveland Caseload: Pro Se vs. Represented, (July 2009)
(custom report on file with the author).
262 See ACLU Sues U.S. Immigration Officials and For-Profit Corrections Corporation
Over Grossly Deficient Health Care, ACLU, (June 13, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/immigrantsrights/aclu-sues-us-immigration-officials-and-profit-corrections-corporation-over-grossly.
(“[D]etainees are routinely subjected to long delays before treatment, denied necessary
medication for chronic illnesses, and refused essential referrals prescribed by medical staff.”).
263 See, e.g., David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights
as Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 378 (2003) (“The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clauses should also apply equally to citizens and noncitizens. If the state cannot
take a citizen’s life, liberty, or property without due process of law, why should it be able to take
a noncitizen’s life, liberty or property without due process? It is generally just as much an
imposition on a foreign national’s physical freedom to be locked up as it is an imposition on a
citizen’s freedom. The government sometimes argues that noncitizens are entitled to diminished
due process, but it is not clear why that should be so.”); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 953, 984 (2002) (“[W]hile the rights of aliens are undoubtedly qualified in certain
circumstances, these circumstances do not justify the imposition of a double standard across the
board. Rather, they suggest that outside of a declared war against an identifiable nation, aliens
living among us are entitled to those constitutional rights not expressly restricted to citizens,
including most critically the rights of due process, political freedom, and equal protection.”);
Clay McCaslin, “My Jailor is My Judge”: Kestutis Zadvydas and the Indefinite Imprisonment of
Permanent Resident Aliens by the INS, 75 TUL. L. REV. 193, 230 (2000) (“To imprison a person
indefinitely after completion of his or her criminal sentence . . . offends every conceivable
notion of due process and liberty contained in the United States Constitution. For these
unfortunate individuals, a simple error in judgment can result in a lifetime of hell at the hands of
the U.S. government.”).
264 George W. Bush, President of the United States, Address to the Nation on Immigration
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immigrants the only aliens denied fundamental protections. Lawful
permanent residents as well as illegal immigrants are subject to the
DHS indefinite-detention regulation, and LPRs may be deported for
offenses as trivial as shoplifting.265 Immigration Control and
Enforcement (“ICE”) officers may with impunity enter any alien’s
home without a warrant and interrogate his children regarding his
parents’ and relatives’ immigration status.266 In some communities,
parents cannot walk their children to school or drive to the grocery
store for fear of being unlawfully interrogated by ICE. By causing
millions of our immigrant neighbors to fear the government, these
policies make them susceptible to exploitation and abuse.
The Supreme Court itself recognized in Plyler v. Doe267 the danger
of perpetuating a permanent subclass of persons within the country. In
that case, the Court considered a Texas school law that denied free
elementary education to immigrants who entered without proper
documentation.268 The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed that the
Constitution protects aliens as “persons” under the Fourteenth
Amendment even if they are in the United States unlawfully. 269
Though prior Supreme Court precedents had required strict scrutiny
analysis when lawful permanent residents challenged state law on
equal protection grounds,270 illegal immigrants had never been
afforded greater protection than that of a rational basis review.

Reform, 42 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 924, 931 (May 15, 2006).
265 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006) (making a lawful permanent resident removable
for a crime of moral turpitude when it is a second offense); Da Rosa Silva v. INS, 263 F. Supp.
2d 1005, 1010–1012 (E.D. Penn. 2003) (holding shoplifting to be a crime of moral turpitude
under the federal immigration law)..
266 Because deportation is a civil action, information gleaned from such 4th Amendment
violations are rarely subject to exclusion. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050–51
(1984) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply in civil deportation hearings).
267 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
268 Id. at 205.
269 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210 (“Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is
surely a ‘person’” for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also, id. at 243 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (“I have no quarrel with the conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment applies to aliens who, after their illegal entry into this country, are
indeed physically ‘within the jurisdiction’ of a state.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
270 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (striking down Arizona and
Pennsylvania laws denying welfare benefits to lawful permanent residents). The Court
explained that “[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular minority’ . . .
for whom . . . heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.” Id. at 372 (quoting United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)); see also Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1
(1977) (striking down New York law denying college scholarships to foreign born lawful
permanent residents who chose not to relinquish their foreign citizenship).
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Nevertheless, Plyler “employed a heightened level of rational basis
review” to strike down the Texas law.271 Justice Powell defended the
approach as a proper response to the “lifelong penalty and stigma”
that would attach to immigrant children who lacked an education.272
He explained, “[a] legislative classification that threatens the creation
of an underclass of future citizens and residents cannot be reconciled
with one of the fundamental purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”273 Though the Plyler dissent objected to the plurality’s
undisguised policy making,274 it fully agreed with the ends of that
policy.275
Plyler may have been constitutionally infirm in its reasoning, but
by assuring immigrant children’s access to basic education, it helped
avoid deepening the shadow into which immigrants are forced to
retreat. The Supreme Court acknowledged that while immigrants’
labor is welcome, they are “virtually defenseless against any abuse,
exploitation, or callous neglect to which the state or the state’s natural
citizens and business organizations may wish to subject them.”276
They can be deprived of fair wages and safe working conditions and
they can be subject to workplace sexual abuse, domestic violence, and
human trafficking with impunity by those who rely on their fear of
deportation.277 Every time immigration laws are made harsher and
procedural protections weaker, the immigrant community is made
more fearful and pushed deeper into the shadows. “This situation
raises the specter of a permanent caste of undocumented resident
aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap labor,

271 LeClerc
272 Plyler,

v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 416 (5th Cir. 2005).
457 U.S. at 239 (Powell, J., concurring).

273 Id.
274 Id. at 242 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“The Court makes no attempt to disguise that it is
acting to make up for Congress’ lack of ‘effective leadership’ . . . .”).
275 Id. (“I fully agree that it would be folly—and wrong—to tolerate creation of a segment
of society made up of illiterate persons . . . .”).
276 Id. at 219 n.18 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 458 F. Supp. 569, 585 n.18 (E.D. Tex. 1978)).
277 See Laura Carothers Graham, Relief for Battered Women Under the Violence Against
Women Act, 10 DEL. L. REV. 263, 263 (2008) (“A large number of immigrant victims of
domestic violence cite fear of being reported to immigration authorities by their abuser . . . [as
one of] their main bases for remaining in an abusive relationship.”); Suzanne H. Jackson, To
Honor and Obey: Trafficking in “Mail-Order Brides,” 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 475, 477 (2002)
(“[T]raffickers . . . abuse people physically and sexually, confiscating passports and threatening
deportation.”); Gerhard A. Miller, Immigration and National Law, 1977 ANN. SURV. AM. L.
205, 228 (“Once the aliens arrive, they live under the constant fear of detection and deportation,
and are thus easily exploited . . . .”); Jayashri Srikantiah, Perfect Victims and Real Survivors:
The Iconic Victim in Domestic Human Trafficking Law, 87 B.U. L. REV. 157, 158 (2007)
(discussing the magnitude of human trafficking on immigrants subject to deportation).
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but nevertheless denied the benefits that our society makes available
to citizens and lawful residents.”278
Aliens detained indefinitely under the DHS regulation are less
sympathetic than the school children of Plyler, but this does not make
their plight less important. The regulation’s anemic protections
unnecessarily impose the risk of lifelong incarceration.279 The
regulation’s procedures would be clearly unconstitutional if they were
used as a civil commitment mechanism for similarly situated
citizens.280 The regulation is therefore a piece of the dark patchwork
of United States immigration laws that relegates our alien neighbors
to the shadows of society. Whether it is by Supreme Court action on
due process grounds or by Congressional fiat, the invalidation of the
DHS regulation would help the nation move back toward its
egalitarian ideal.
CONCLUSION
Santos Hernandez–Carrera committed a crime, and his prison
sentence paid his debt to society. His subsequent seventeen years of
imprisonment and the lifetime of detention before him are
unconscionable unless the detention is necessary to keep him from
harming society. If the necessity of his incarceration had been
litigated with the protections available to a citizen, Hernandez–
Carrera would almost certainly be a free man. But the procedural due
process ensured to a citizen was not provided, and he faces a lifetime
in prison. Such denial of foundational constitutional rights relegates
Hernandez–Carrera and millions of law-abiding aliens to a life of fear
and injustice.
During the past ten years, the Supreme Court narrowed plenary
power in immigration law, explicitly recognized some inadmissible
aliens’ constitutional right to habeas corpus, and implicitly recognized
a substantive right of lawful permanent residents to be free from
indefinite detention. Zadvydas and Boumediene seriously undermined
Mezei, and, with it, the entry fiction doctrine. The Supreme Court is
now free to consider the sufficiency of the procedural due process
provided by the DHS indefinite-detention regulation. The question is
a close one, but a fair application of Eldridge balancing does not quite
278 Plyler,

457 U.S. at 218–19.
of five of Hernandez–Carrera’s professional psychiatric evaluators concluded that
the public would be safe if he was released with modest restrictive conditions. Brief for
Appellees, supra note 2, at 4.
280 See supra Part III.B.3 (comparing protections under 8 C.F.R. § 241.14 with those
required for citizens).
279 Four
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compel the invalidation of the regulation. Invalidating the regulation
would not require the Court to weigh an alien’s liberty interest the
same as a citizen’s, but the ruling would require some explicit
weighting, creating a precedential benchmark.
The Supreme Court should create such a precedent. It would be
fairer and more humane to mentally ill aliens to protect them from
unnecessary indefinite detention. Equally importantly, the precedent
would provide a touchstone by which to evaluate other egregious
denials of aliens’ due process protections. Providing aliens with
greater legal protections allows them to step out of the shadows where
they are subject to exploitation and prejudice.
If the DHS regulation is invalidated and men like Hernandez–
Carrera are turned over to the states’ civil detention regimes, the DHS
may ensure the public’s safety and reduce its workload. It could
complete removal proceedings and decide before the completion of
the alien’s sentence whether he had to be deported.281 If the DHS
could not return him to his own country, it could let the local state
officials handle the case the same as they do a citizen. If after
completion of the state civil-commitment proceedings, a court found
that the alien was not sufficiently dangerous to require incarceration,
he would be freed subject to supervision, and the state would be
spared a major, long-term expense. If the court decided that he
required confinement, he would have access to the same treatment
services available to citizens, and, as a result, he might again become
a contributing member of society.
If the Supreme Court is unable or unwilling to invalidate the DHS
regulation on procedural due process grounds, Congress should do so
based on its unfairness and its contribution to a two-class society.
Throughout the world today there are men, women, and
children interned indefinitely, awaiting trials which may
never come or which may be a mockery of the word, because
their governments believe them to be “dangerous.” Our
Constitution, whose construction began two centuries ago,
can shelter us forever from the evils of such unchecked
power.282

281 This would have the additional benefit of deporting removable aliens immediately at the
conclusion of their prison term rather than waiting up to six months to determine removability.
282 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 767 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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